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Articles

Reconceptualizing Sentencing
DouglasA. Bermant

The transformation of the sentencing enterprise throughout
the United States over the past three decades has been remarkable. The field of sentencing, once rightly accused of being "lawless,"' is now replete with law. Legislatures and sentencing
commissions have replaced the discretionary indeterminate sentencing systems that had been dominant for nearly a century
with an array of structured or guideline systems to govern sentencing decisionmaking. These modern sentencing developments
constitute one of the most dynamic and important law reform
stories in recent American legal history-a veritable sentencing
revolution.2
Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. Thanks to
Ronald Wright for helpful comments on an early draft and to David Johnson for terrific
research assistance.
1 See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U Cin L Rev 1 (1972). See
also Marvin E. Frankel, CriminalSentences: Law Without Order(Hill & Wang 1972).
2 See Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Reform "Reform" through Sentencing Information
Systems, in Michael Tonry, ed, The Future of Imprisonment 121 (Oxford 2004) ("Sentencing has undergone more reform over the past several decades than any other area of
criminal justice, and perhaps as much reform as any area of the law."). Professor Michael
Tonry captured this point nicely a few years ago: "If a time machine were to transport a
group of state and federal judges from 1970 to a national conference on sentencing in
1995, most would be astonished by a quarter century's changes." Michael Tonry, Twenty
Years of Sentencing Reform: Steps Forward,Steps Backward, 78 Judicature 169, 169
(1995).
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Yet the modern sentencing era has been marked by a failure
to reconceptualize modern sentencing. The new sentencing laws,
the United States Supreme Court's sentencing jurisprudence,
and even the scholarly literature in the field,3 are all conceptually underdeveloped. The basic story of the sentencing revolution, especially in the federal system, has been frequently recounted, but the theories, structures, and procedures of modern
sentencing decisionmaking have not been deeply examined.
Against this backdrop, it is not all that surprising that the
Supreme Court's blockbuster rulings in Blakely v Washington4
and United States v Booke,5 have generated puzzled reactions
and some impassioned criticisms, even though the decisions reflect certain fundamentally sound conceptual principles. The
drama that has surrounded the Blakely and Booker decisionsand their aftermath-ultimately reflects a collective failure to
reconceptualize sentencing in the wake of the sentencing revolution. It also makes more urgent the task of reconceptualizing
modern sentencing.
In this Article, I locate Blakely and Booker within a broader
conceptual story of sentencing reform. This story begins by noting the modern evolution of sentencing principles and practices,
and thereafter highlights how the sentencing revolution and the
3 Though a small band of committed academics write regularly about sentencing
issues, Professor Stephanos Bibas rightly has called sentencing "an academic backwater,
divorced from criminal law and procedure." Stephanos Bibas, JudicialFact-Findingand
Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas,110 Yale L J 1097, 1185 (2001). We
have not seen in the academic literature, for example, a serious or robust law and economics dialogue, nor a serious or robust civic republican or federalism dialogue, nor a
serious or robust Rawlsian or libertarian or feminist dialogue about modem sentencing
reforms.
Recently, more than a few criminal law academics have lamented that criminal
law teaching and scholarship about punishment theory has been stunted. See Kyron
Huigens, On Commonplace Punishment Theory, 2005 U Chi Legal F 437; Tracey L.
Meares, Neal Katyal, and Dan M. Kahan, Updatingthe Study of Punishment, 56 Stan L
Rev 1171, 1172 (2004). These valid concerns dovetail with my points about sentencing's
backwater status and may reflect more broadly how criminal law teaching and scholarship is still principally consumed with the issues raised and debated by the drafters of the
Model Penal Code and the Justices of the Warren Court. Consider Douglas A. Berman,
The Model Penal Code Second"Might 'Film Schools"Be in Need of a RemakeZ 1 Ohio St
J Crim L 163 (2003) (lamenting that criminal law teaching and scholarship has not kept
up with modern transformations in the field). Consider this telling bit of amateur empiricism: a search on Lexis in the law review database for the last ten years of "mens rea"
and "Model Penal Code" produced more than twice as many articles as a search of "mens
rea" and "Federal Sentencing Guidelines." I find it remarkable that the academic literature is still conceptually examining an imaginary code twice as much as the biggest sentencing system in the country.
4 542 US 296 (2004).
5 124 S Ct 2531 (2005).
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Supreme Court's modern sentencing jurisprudence have suffered
from being conceptually underdeveloped. I conclude the story by
proposing some ideas that may help bring greater conceptual
order to a field that now seems so disorderly. The Blakely and
Booker decisions mark, both literally and figuratively, a constitutional moment in the evolution of modern sentencing reform, and
they offer policymakers, courts, and academics an important opportunity to engage seriously in the overdue task of reconceptualizing modern sentencing.
I. THE OLD CONCEPT OF SENTENCING AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
BLESSING

Beginning in the late nineteenth century and throughout the
first three-quarters of the twentieth century, a highly discretionary system was the dominant approach to sentencing.6 Trial
judges in both federal and state systems had nearly unfettered
discretion to impose upon defendants any sentence from within
the broad statutory ranges provided for criminal offenses;7 parole
officials likewise possessed unfettered discretion to decide precisely when offenders were to be allowed to leave prison.'
Though lacking a fundamental legal structure, this model of
sentencing was formally and fully conceptualized around the
"rehabilitative ideal."9 Trial judges were afforded broad discretion in the imposition of sentencing terms, and parole officials
exercised similar discretion concerning prison release dates, for a
6 Sandra Shane-Dubow, Alice P. Brown, and Eric Olsen, Sentencing Reform in the
United States: History, Content, and Effect 5-6 (Natl Inst of Just 1985); J.L. Miller,
Marilyn McCoy Roberts, and Charlotte A. Carter, Sentencing Reform: A Review and
AnnotatedBibliography1-6 (Natl Ctr for State Cts 1981).
7 See, for example, Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 6 (Oxford 1995) ("Subject
only to statutory maximums and occasional minimums, judges had authority to decide
whether a convicted defendant was sentenced to probation (and with what conditions) or
to jail or prison (and for what maximum term)."). See also Mistretta v United States, 488
US 361, 363 (1989) (discussing the "wide discretion" given to federal judges in ascribing
sentences during this time).
' See, for example, Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rtionality and Release Decisions by ParoleBoards, 45 SC L Rev 567, 568 (1994) ("Traditionally, a parole
board's unfettered discretion determined when an offender could leave prison. Within
broad parameters set by the legislature, the authority of parole decision makers has been
extensive and far-reaching.").
9 Consider Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: Penal Policy
and Social Purpose 5-7 (Yale 1981) (discussing the "dominance" and "almost unchallenged sway of the rehabilitative ideal" in the United States until the 1970s); Francis A.
Allen, CrinminalJustice, Legal Value and the Rehabilitative Ideal,50 J Crim L Criminol
& Pol Sci 226 (1959) (describing how much of the thought and activity surrounding reforms in the criminal justice system during the first half of the twentieth century centered around the "rehabilitative ideal").
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clear and defined purpose: to allow sentences to be tailored to the
rehabilitation prospects and progress of each individual offender.' ° The rehabilitative ideal often was conceived and discussed in medical terms, with offenders described as "sick" and
punishments aspiring to "cure the patient."" Sentencing judges
and parole officials were thought to have unique insights and
expertise in deciding what sorts and lengths of punishments
were necessary to best serve each criminal offender's rehabilitation potential. 12 Sentencing was conceived procedurally as a form
of administrative decisionmaking in which sentencing experts,
aided by complete information about offenders, and possessing
unfettered discretion, were expected to craft individualized sentences "almost like a doctor or social worker exercising clinical
judgment." 3
In 1949, the United States Supreme Court constitutionally
approved this philosophical and procedural approach to sentencing in Williams v New York. 14 The trial judge in Williams sentenced to death a defendant convicted of first-degree murder,
despite a jury recommendation of life imprisonment."5 The trial
court relied upon information about the defendant's illegal and
unsavory activities that was not presented at trial, but rather
appeared in a pre-sentence report.1" Rejecting a claim that Williams had a right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him, the Supreme Court emphasized that "[r]eformation
and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of

1oSee Andrew von Hirsch, The Sentencing Commission's Functions,in Andrew von
Hirsch, et al, eds, The Sentencing Commission and Its Guidelines3 (Northeastern 1987)
("[W]ide discretion was ostensibly justified for rehabilitative ends: to enable judges and
parole officials familiar with the case to choose a disposition tailored to the offender's
need for treatment.").
11 See President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 163 (GPO 1967) (describing offenders as "patients"); Michael Vitiello, ReconsideringRehabilitation,65 Tulane L Rev 1011, 1016-18
(1991) (discussing the medical model and its "powerful sway within the criminal justice
system").
12 See Nancy Gertner, What Has Harris Wrought 15 Fed Sent Rptr 83, 84 (2002)
(describing the vision of the "judge as the sentencing expert" in a rehabilitative sentencing system); Kate Stith and Jos6 A. Cabranes, FearofJudging Sentencing Guidelines in
the FederalCourts 20-22 (Chicago 1998) (describing the view of parole officials as experts
in assessing an offender's rehabilitation).
13 United States vMuetfleman, 327 F Supp 2d 79, 83 (D Mass 2004).
14 337 US 241 (1949).
15 Id at 242.
16 Id at 242-44. For a full discussion of the various "facts" that the sentencing judge
in Wiliams rehled upon, see Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense
Sentencing,45 Stan L Rev 523, 528-30 (1993).
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criminal jurisprudence." 7 The Court spoke approvingly of judges
and parole boards exercising broad discretion in order to further
the "prevalent modern philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime." 8
The Williams Court asserted that the Due Process Clause
should not be read to require courts to "abandon their age-old
practice of seeking information from out-of-court sources," because "[t]o deprive sentencing judges of this kind of information
would undermine modern penological procedural policies," 9
which rely upon judges having "the fullest information possible
concerning the defendant's life and characteristics."" According
to the Williams Court, the value of "modern concepts individualizing punishments" meant that sentencing judges should "not be
denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence
properly applicable to the trial."2 '
In other words, for the Williams Court, the rehabilitative
ideal not only justified entrusting judges and parole officials with
enormous sentencing discretion, but also called for sentencing
judges (and presumably also parole officials) to be freed from any
procedural rules that might limit the sound exercise of their discretion. Once guilt was established at a traditional trial, the sentencing experts should be able to gather all possible information
from all possible sources in order to craft and administer rehabilitation-oriented punishments.
Critically, the Williams Court suggested that the rehabilitative ideal and its distinctive procedures offered benefits for offenders as well as for society. The Court stressed that "modern
changes" justified by the rehabilitative model of sentencing "have
not resulted in making the lot of offenders harder." Rather, explained the Court, "a strong motivating force for the changes has
been the belief that by careful study of the lives and personalities
of convicted offenders many could be less severely punished and
restored sooner to complete freedom and useful citizenship." The
Williams Court claimed that "[t]his belief to a large extent has
been justified."2 2

17

Williams, 337 US at 248.

18

Id at 247.

'9 Id at 249-50.
20 Id at 247.
21

Wil'ams, 337 US at 247.

22

Id at 249.
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Williams was decided before the United States Supreme
Court began "revolutionizing" criminal procedure by interpreting
the Constitution expansively to provide criminal defendants with
an array of procedural rights.23 Nevertheless, throughout the
1960s and 1970s, as numerous pre-trial and trial rights were being established for defendants, the Supreme Court continued to
cite Williams favorably and continued to suggest that sentencing
proceedings should be far less procedurally regulated than traditional criminal trials.24 Though the Court secured defendants the
right to an attorney at sentencing hearings,25 and suggested that
defendants also had a right to discovery of evidence that could
impact a sentence,26 the Court did not formally extend other Bill
of Rights protections to the sentencing process.
In 1978, the Supreme Court had occasion in United States v
Grayso2 7 to discuss at length the historical development of the
rehabilitative ideal and its place in federal sentencing practices.28
23

The application and extension of considerable procedural rights to criminal defen-

dants has been called the criminal procedure "revolution" and often is associated with the
work of the Warren Court in the 1960s. See, for example, The Criminal Law Reporter,
The Criminal Law Revolution: 1960-1969 (Bureau of Nati Affairs 1969) (detailing the
changes wrought by the criminal law revolution through a Term-by-Term recounting of
nine "revolutionary" years of the Warren Court); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and
CriminalJustice.A Quarter-CenturyRetrospective, 31 Tulsa L J 1 (1995) (providing an
overview of the "revolution" in American criminal procedure that occurred under the
Warren Court between 1961 and 1966 or 1967). As commentators have discussed, however, the Burger Court, through the 1970s, extended, or even first developed, many of the
foundational doctrines of this era. See, for example, Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of CriminalProcedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72
Georgetown L J 185 (1983) (detailing how some critics view the Burger Court as merely
fine tuning the procedural revolution of the Warren Court); Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court:An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal
Procedure,80 Colum L Rev 436 (1980) (exploring how the Burger Court continued its
predecessor's use of the criminal justice system as a tool for social engineering); Stephen
A. Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of ConstitutionalCriminalProcedurein the
Warren and Burger Courts, 69 Georgetown L J 151 (1980) (arguing that contrary to
common misperceptions, the Burger Court did not substantially undercut the decisions of
its predecessor).
24 See, for example, Chaffln v Stynchcmbe, 412 US 17, 21-25 (1973) (citing Williams
as the source of modem criminal sentencing philosophy and stressing "the need for flexibility and discretion in the sentencing process"); North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711,
723 (1969) (favorably citing Williams when emphasizing "the freedom of a sentencing
judge" to consider a defendant's post-conviction conduct in imposing a sentence). See also
Pearce, 395 US at 742 (Black concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the
Supreme Court has "continued to reaffirm" Williams and its "reasons for refusing to subject the sentencing process to any [significant procedural] limitations, which might hamstring modem penological reforms").
25 Mempa vRhay, 389 US 128 (1967).
26 Brady v Maryland,373 US 83 (1963).
27 438 US 41 (1978).
28 Id at 45-52.

RECONCEPTUALIZING SENTENCING

In a footnote, the Grayson Court observed that "[ilncreasingly
there are doubts concerning the validity of earlier, uncritical acceptance of the rehabilitation model."2 9 The Grayson Court nevertheless upheld a sentencing judge's consideration of a defendant's false testimony on the ground that the defendant's testimony was "probative of his prospects for rehabilitation."3 ° Favorably citing Williams, the Court asserted that the "evolutionary history of sentencing . . . demonstrates that it is properindeed, even necessary for the rational exercise of discretion-to
consider the defendant's whole person and personality."3 1 The
Grayson Court thus reaffirmed its fealty to the rehabilitative
ideal and asserted that at sentencing "a judge may appropriately
conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to
the kind of information he may consider, or the source from
which it may come."32
A year later in Greenholtz v Inmates of Nebraska Penaland
3 a case concerning due process rights in
CorrectionalComplex,"
parole release determinations, the Supreme Court again extolled
the sentencing goal of rehabilitation. 4 The Greenholtz Court,
after positively describing parole decisionmaking as "necessarily
subjective in part and predictive in part" and involving a "discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables,"3 5 emphasized that it must "not overlook the ultimate purpose of parole
which is a component of the long-range objective of rehabilitation."3 6 Rejecting offenders' claims for greater procedural rights
in parole release determinations, the Court asserted that parole
decisionmaking should not be "encumbered by procedures that
states regard as burdensome and unwarranted."3 7 The Court expressed concern about "encourag[ing] a continuing state of adversar[ial] relations between society and the inmate," which
might undermine the "desirable objectives" of "rehabilitating

Id at 47n6.
0 Id at 52.
31 Grayson, 438 US at 53.
32 Id at 50 (quoting United States v Tucker, 404 US 443, 446 (1972)). See also Roberts
v UnitedStates, 445 US 552, 556 (1980) (explicitly reaffnming the Grayson and Tucker
Courts' belief in the broad scope of a judge's inquiry at sentencing).
29

33 442 US 1 (1979).
34 Id at 13.
31 Id at 10, 13 (citing Sanford M. Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in
the Peno-CorrectionalProcess,45 Minn L Rev 803, 813 (1961)).
36 Id at 13.
31 Greenholtz,442 US at 13.

THE UNIVERSITY OFCHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2005:

convicted persons to be useful, law-abiding members of society."38
The Greenholtz Court thus endorsed not only the rehabilitative
ideal, but also the broad discretion that it afforded sentencing
authorities without providing defendants with any significant
procedural rights.
II. THE CONCEPTUALLY UNDERDEVELOPED SENTENCING
REVOLUTION

While the theory and procedures of the rehabilitative model
of sentencing were being sanctioned in the United States Supreme Court, in other quarters they were being questioned.
Through the 1960s and 1970s, criminal justice scholars grew
concerned about the unpredictable and disparate sentences that
highly discretionary sentencing systems could produce. Evidence
suggested that broad judicial sentencing discretion resulted in
substantial and undue differences in the lengths and types of
sentences meted out to similar defendants.3 9 Some studies found
that personal factors, such as an offender's race, gender, and socioeconomic status, impacted sentencing outcomes and accounted
for certain disparities.4 °
Driven by concerns about the disparities resulting from
highly discretionary sentencing practices-which dovetailed with
concerns about increasing crime rates and broad criticisms of the
entire rehabilitative model of punishment and corrections 4 1Id at 13-14.
39 See, for example, Ilene H. Nagel, Foreword: StructuringSentencing Discretion:
The New FederalSentencing Guidelines, 80 J Crim L & Criminol 883, 895-97 (1990)
(detailing studies showing widespread, unwarranted sentencing disparities); Norval Morris, Towards PrincipledSentencing,37 Md L Rev 267, 272-74 (1977) (reviewing studies of
judicial sentencing and asserting that "the data on unjust sentencing disparity have
indeed become quite overwhelming").
40 See William W. Wilkins, Jr., Phyllis J. Newton, and John R. Steer, The Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984: A Bold Approach to the UnwarrantedSentencingDisparityProblem,
2 Crim L F 355, 358-62 (1991) (reviewing studies revealing the impact of racial discrimination at sentencing); Nagel, 80 J Crim L & Criminol at 895-97 & nn 73-84 (cited in note
39) (discussing empirical studies documenting the sentencing impact of race, gender,
socioeconomic class, and other status characteristics).
41 See Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice ofPunishments 3-34, 59-123
(Hill & Wang 1976) (discussing the failures of the rehabilitative model of sentencing and
calling for new principles to govern decisions about how severely offenders should be
punished); James Q. Wilson, Thinking about Crime 162-82 (Basic 1975) (exploring possible reforms in sentencing procedures to combat the failings of the rehabilitative model);
Ernest van den Haag, PunishingCriminals:Concerninga Very Old and Painful Question
3-72 (Basic 1975) (analyzing punishment as a social institution in need of change). Consider Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal at 7-20 (cited in note 9) (discussing
the "wide and precipitous decline of penal rehabiitationism" as a foundational theory for
the criminal justice system). Some of the pragmatic concerns about the rehabilitation
38
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criminal justice experts and scholars proposed reforms to bring
greater consistency and certainty to the sentencing enterprise.4 2
Led by the groundbreaking and highly influential work of Judge
Marvin Frankel,4 3 many reformers came to propose or endorse
some form of sentencing guidelines to govern sentence determinations.' Reformers also suggested creating specialized commissions to develop these guidelines.4 5
The calls for reform were soon heeded. Through the late
1970s and early 1980s, a few states adopted a form of sentencing
guidelines when legislatures passed determinate sentencing
statutes that abolished parole and created presumptive sentenc-

model were most famously captured in Robert Martinson's widely discussed short paper,
What Works?-Questions andAnswers About Prison Reform, 35 Pub Interest 22 (1974),
which reviewed numerous studies evaluating efforts at penal rehabilitation. Martinson's
conclusions, which were generally discouraging, became quickly oversimplified through
the assertion that "nothing works." Id at 48.
42 For examples of such proposed reforms see National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, Model Sentencing and Corrections Act (GPO 1979); Pierce
O'Donnell, Michael J. Churgin, and Dennis E. Curtis, Toward a Just and Effective Sentencing System: Agenda for Legislative Reform (Praeger 1977); Fairand Certain Punishment: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing
(McGraw-Hill 1976); von Hirsch, Doing Justice (cited in note 41); David Fogel, ' . . We
Are the Living Proof.. ": The Justice Model For Corrections(WH Anderson 1975). See
also Norval Morris, The Future of Imprisonment 28-57 (Chicago 1974) (stressing the
need to reform sentencing practices as a prerequisite to making imprisonment a rational
and humane means of punishment). Consider Alfred Blumstein, et al, Research on Sentencing: The Search for Reform 126-40 (Natl Academy 1983) (describing forces behind
early reforms); Miller, Roberts, and Carter, Sentencing Reform at 6-13 (cited in note 6)
(noting that "perceptions of increasing crime, unwarranted differences in sentences, and
ineffective rehabilitation programs" stimulated sentencing reform).
43 See note 1.
44 See note 42. See also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion?Reflections
on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 Harv L Rev 1938, 1944 (1988) (noting the
.general consensus [in the 1970s] ... among judges, lawyers, criminal justice experts, and
scholars that sentencing guidelines were needed"); Stephen Breyer, The FederalSentencing Guidelinesand the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L Rev 1, 3
(1988) ("At the federal level before 1985, scholars and practitioners in the criminal justice
community almost unanimously favored the concept of guidelines.").
45 See Michael H. Tonry, The Sentencing Commission in Sentencing Reform, 7 Hofstra L Rev 315, 323-24 (1978) (noting that "a politically insulated, independent commission with rulemaking authority" would be best suited to provide the necessary guidance
to achieve uniformity and fairness in sentencing); National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, Model Sentencing and CorrectionsAct at 127-30 (cited in note
42) (proposing the creation of a sentencing commission to establish presumptive sentences for criminal offenses); O'Donnell, Churgin, and Curtis, Toward a Just and Effective
Sentencing System at 73-74 (cited in note 42) (proposing the creation of a "U.S. Commission on Sentencing and Corrections... to formulate guidelines for structuring sentencing
decisions and to revise these guidelines periodically"); Fairand Certain Punishment at
25-26 (cited in note 42) (recommending that "the legislature establish a commission composed of representatives of the judiciary and other interested groups to undertake the
drafting, establishment, and periodic review of a presumptive sentencing system").

10
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ing ranges for various classes of offenses.4 6 Minnesota became
the first state to adopt comprehensively the guidelines reform
model in 1978, when the Minnesota legislature established the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission to develop sentencing guidelines.4 7 Pennsylvania and Washington followed suit
by creating their own distinctive forms of sentencing commissions and guidelines in 1982 and 1983 respectively.4" The federal
government soon thereafter joined this sentencing reform movement through the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
("SRA"), 49 which created the United States Sentencing Commission to develop guidelines for federal sentencing." Throughout
the next two decades, many more states adopted some form of
structured sentencing. 1 Though some states did so only through
a few mandatory sentencing statutes, many states created sentencing commissions to develop comprehensive guidelines
schemes.52
46 See Michael H. Tonry, Sentencing Reform Impacts 77-85 (US Dept of Justice 1987)
(detailing ten states' adoption of determinate sentencing after they abolished parole);
Bureau of Justice Assistance, National Assessment of Structured Sentencing 14-17 (US
Dept of Justice 1996) (discussing the move in various jurisdictions to adopt determinate
sentencing).
47 1978 Minn Laws 723 (enabling statute). The initial version of the Minnesota sentencing guidelines was contained in Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Report to the Legislature(1980). Consider Dale Parent, StructuringCriminalSentences. the
Evolution of Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines (Butterworth 1988) (discussing the operations of Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines Commission and the state's enactment and
early experiences with sentencing guidelines).
48 See 204 Pa Code § 303 (1982), codified at 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9721 (West 1998);
Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.905 (West 2003). Consider Appendix: A Summary of the
Minnesota, Washington, and Pennsylvania Guidelines,in von Hirsh, ed, The Sentencing
Commission and Its Guidelines 177-88 (cited in note 10) (reviewing major components of
guidelines developed in Minnesota, Washington, and Pennsylvania).
During the early 1980s, various systems of sentencing guidelines also emerged in
Utah, Maryland, Florida, and Michigan, although permanent sentencing commissions
were not established in these states until years later. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing
Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, and the Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 Fed Sent Rptr 69, 70 (2000) (summarizing the development of sentencing
guidelines systems in different jurisdictions).
49 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987 (1984), codified at
18 USC § 3551 (2000).
50 See id.
51 See Bureau of Justice Assistance, NationalAssessment of Structured Sentencing
at 19-29 & Tables 3-3, 3-4 & 3-5 (cited in note 46) (detailing sentencing structures
throughout United States as of February 1994); Frase, 12 Fed Sent Rptr at 69-72 (cited
in note 48) (detailing and discussing the nearly two dozen jurisdictions that now have, or
are actively considering, a sentencing system incorporating sentencing guidelines devised
by a sentencing commission); Dale Parent, et al, Key Legislative Issues in CriminalJustice: Mandatory Sentencing 1, 1 (Natl Inst of Just 1997) (noting that "Ibly 1994, all 50
States had enacted one or more mandatory sentencing laws, and Congress had enacted
numerous mandatory sentencing laws for Federal offenders").
52 Bureau of Justice Assistance, National Assessment of Structured Sentencing at
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Though there is considerable variation in the form and impact of structured sentencing reforms, these developments can be
viewed as a "sentencing revolution" that has altered criminal
justice practices and outcomes as much as, if not more than, the
"criminal procedure revolution" that the United States Supreme
Court engineered in the 1960s and 1970s. And yet, while the sentencing reforms of the last three decades have brought an enormous amount of law to sentencing, this sentencing revolution has
been both theoretically and procedurally underdeveloped.
The sentencing revolution has been theoretically underdeveloped because it largely has been a conceptual anti-movement.
Many jurisdictions moved to structured sentencing systems and
abolished the institution of parole not in express pursuit of a new
sentencing theory, but rather as simply a rejection of the rehabilitative ideal that had been dominant for nearly a century.
Though some early reform advocates urged replacing the rehabilitative ideal with a modernized retributivist philosophy (often
termed a "just deserts" model),53 and though some policymakers
called for mandatory sentencing terms in order to deter and incapacitate offenders, the only clear goals of the sentencing reforms in many jurisdictions were the repudiation of rehabilitation as the dominant theory of punishment and the elimination
of sentencing disparities that resulted from discretionary sentencing practices.
The details of this theoretical story vary in different jurisdictions, but the conceptual struggles of the federal sentencing system are well-documented and revealing. Though in the Sentencing Reform Act Congress expressed a fundamental concern with
principled sentencing,54 the SRA did not adopt a particular punishment philosophy; rather, its statutory statement of purposes
19-29 (cited in note 46).
53 See, for example, von Hirsch, The Sentencing Commission and Its Guidelines at
35-104 (cited in note 10); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Model Sentencing and CorrectionsAct § 3-101(1) and Comment (cited in note 42); Fogel,
t... WeAre the LifingProof . . at 204-36 (cited in note 42).
54 See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of FederalSentencing-The
Need and Opportunityfor JudicialLawmaking, 11 Stan L & Pol Rev 93, 97 (1999) ("Congress' fundamental concern with principled sentencing was highlighted by the SRA's
repeated references to its basic statement of purposes, as well as by the Senate Report's
emphasis on the requirement that 'each Federal offender be sentenced . . . in order to
achieve the general purposes of sentencing."); Daniel J. Freed and Marc Miller, Taking
"Purposes"Seriously" The Neglected Requirement of Guideline Sentencing, 3 Fed Sent
Rptr 295, 295 (1991) ("In its 1984 charter for Federal sentencing, Congress made one
principle clear: the 'purposes of sentencing' were to play a central role in formulating
individual sentences and in drafting Commission guidelines."),

12
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listed all of the traditional justifications of punishment.5 5 Except
to state that a term of imprisonment is not an appropriate means
to seek rehabilitation, 56 Congress provided no express instructions concerning the specific application of sentencing purposes
throughout the federal guidelines system." In turn, the United
States Sentencing Commission, though making an initial effort
to formulate guidelines premised on one particular theory of punishment," ultimately dodged these fundamental issues by relying primarily on the results of past judicial sentencing practices
as the foundation for the initial federal sentencing guidelines.5 9
65 The SRA's supporting Senate Report explained that the SRA calls for the federal
sentencing system to serve "the basic purposes of sentencing-deterrence, incapacitation,
just punishment and rehabilitation." S Rep No 98-225 at 41, 67 (1983), reprinted in 1984
USCCAN 3250. In full text, the statement of purposes set forth in 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)
provides that federal sentences should be crafted:

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
18 USC § 3553(a)(2) (2000).
56 See 18 USC § 3582(a) (2000) (instructing courts to recognize that "imprisonment is
not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation"); 28 USC § 994(k)
(2000) (instructing the Commission to "insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant").
57 See Kenneth R. Feinberg, The FederalSentencing Guidelinesand the Underlying
Purposes of Sentencing, 3 Fed Sent Rptr 326, 326-27 (1991) (discussing how Congress
was "ambivalent" about clearly defining the role and priority of sentencing purposes and
thus "largely fudged the issue in drafting the [SRA]"). Some courts and commentators
have inaccurately asserted that the SRA rejected rehabilitation and adopted "just deserts" and/or deterrence in its prescription of sentencing purposes for the federal sentencing system. See Marc Miller, PurposesAt Sentencing,66 S Cal L Rev 413, 420-37 (1992)
(reviewing, and seeking to correct, many erroneous statements made by judges, probation
officers, lawyers, and scholars concerning the SRA's treatment of sentencing purposes).
58 See Breyer, 17 Hofstra L Rev at 15-18 (1988) (cited in note 44) (discussing how the
United States Sentencing Commission considered adopting, but ultimately chose not to
adopt, one specific philosophical approach to formulating the initial Guidelines); Stith
and Cabranes, Fear of Judging at 53-55 (cited in note 12) (detailing how the United
States Sentencing Guidelines do not reflect a single philosophy of punishment because
the Commission found it difficult to choose one philosophical approach over another).
59 See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual,Ch 1, Pt A, intro
cmt (1987) ("USSG") ("In determining the appropriate sentencing ranges for each offense,
the Commission began by estimating the average sentences now being served within each
category.... [The Commission's initial set of guidelines] relied upon estimates of existing
sentencing practices."); Breyer, 17 Hofstra L Rev at 17-18 (cited in note 44) ("The numbers used and the punishments imposed [by the Guidelines] would come fairly close to
replicating the average pre-Guidelines sentence handed down to particular categories of
criminals.").
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And much to the chagrin of many commentators," through two
decades of federal sentencing reform neither Congress nor the
United States Sentencing Commission has expressly defined or
fully articulated
the central or primary purposes for federal sentencing. 616
The sentencing revolution was also underdeveloped procedurally because absent in all the sentencing lawmaking was any
focused concern for sentencing procedures. In the development of
laws and guidelines to govern substantive sentence decisions,
policymakers devoted scant attention to regulating the processes
through which judges obtain and assess the information that
forms the basis for these decisions. Despite creating a significant
body of substantive sentencing law, legislatures and commissions
in most jurisdictions left largely unaddressed fundamental issues
such as notice to parties, burdens of proof, appropriate factfinders, evidentiary rules, and hearing processes-even though these
procedural matters play a central role in the actual application of
general sentencing rules to specific cases.6"
The particulars of this procedural story also vary across jurisdictions, but again the experiences of the federal sentencing
system are the most conspicuous and well-documented. The Sentencing Reform Act, though an elaborate piece of legislation,
makes only brief mention of sentencing procedures.6 3 The United
60 See, for example, Aaron J. Rappaport, UnprincipledPuishment:the US Sentencing Commission's Troubling Silence about the Purposes of Punishment, 6 Buff Crim L
Rev 1043 (2003); Andrew von Hirsch, Federal Sentencing Guidelines:Do They Provide
Principled Guidance, 27 Am Crim L Rev 367 (1989); Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing
System for the 21st Century 66 Tex L Rev 1 (1987).
61 See Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Equality Pathology,54 Emory L J 271, 279 (2005)
("The federal guidelines have been demonstrably purpose-free."). In two recent articles,
commentators have tried to "rationally reconstruct" the functional purposes of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and reached conflicting conclusions. Compare Paul J. Hofer
and Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Findingand Using the Pthilosophy ofthe FederalSentencing Guidelines,40 Am Crim L Rev 19, 51-52 (2003) (concluding that the philosophy underlying the Guidelines is one of "modified just deserts") with
Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationahzing the Commission: The PhilosophicalPremises of the
US. Sentencing Guidelines,52 Emory L J 557, 561 (2003) (concluding that rational reconstruction of the Guidelines suggests that underlying the Guidelines is "either a pure
utilitarian theory of punishment or, less plausibly, a hybrid theory" combining just deserts and utilitarianism).
62 See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Completing the Sentencing Revolution: Reconsidering
Sentencing Proceduresin the GuidelinesEra, 12 Fed Sent Rptr 187, 187 (2000) (noting
that sentencing reformers largely forgot procedural issues in the development of new
sentencing systems). See also Douglas A. Berman, Appreciating Apprendi: Developing
Sentencing Procedures in the Shadow of the Constitution, 37 Crim L Bull 627, 636-40
(2001) (discussing sentencing reformers' emphasis on substance over procedure).
63 See Thomas W. Hutchinson, et al, FederalSentencing Law and Practice § 6A1.3,
cmt 4 (West 1999) ("In the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress did not provide for specific
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States Sentencing Commission recognized that "[r]eliable factfinding is essential to procedural due process and to the accuracy
and uniformity of sentencing,"6 4 but fewer than three pages of
the initial federal sentencing guidelines expressly addressed the
sentencing process.6" Through a few terse policy statements in
these pages, the Commission called for the preparation and
timely disclosure of pre-sentence reports,6 6 and urged judges to
rely only on information with "sufficient indicia of reliability to
support its probable accuracy."6 7 But in sharp contrast to the
other portions of the Federal Guidelines, which intricately delineated how to incorporate various substantive matters into the
sentencing calculus, the Commission did not go beyond these
vague exhortations to provide any detailed guidance to judges on
issues like notice to parties, appropriate burdens of proof and
factfinders, or applicable evidentiary rules and hearing procedures.6"
The comparable theoretical and procedural stories of structured sentencing reform in the states is more diverse and even
more nuanced than the federal story briefly recounted above.69
Nevertheless, the broad outlines are the same: many states have
rejected in various ways the highly discretionary rehabilitative
model and have structured sentencing decisionmaking in order
to reduce sentencing disparities.70 Despite bringing a lot of law to
procedures at sentencing."); Susan N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog Bifurcated
Fact-FindingUnder the FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Limits ofDue Process,66
S Cal L Rev 289, 314 (1992) ("The Sentencing Reform Act does not mention procedure.").
64 USSG § 6A1 cmt backgd.
65 See id at §§ 6A1.1-1.3.
66 See id at §§ 6A1.1-1.2. The Sentencing Commission delineates sentencing procedures in two brief sections: § 6A1.1, which details the process surrounding the preparation of the presentence report, and § 6A1.2, which details the sentencing process that
takes place once the parties receive the report.
61 USSG § 6A1.3(a).
68 See Stith and Cabranes, Fearof Judgingat 154 (cited in note 12) ("Beyond making
the important but obvious point that fact-finding at sentencing should be reliable, the
Commission's Policy Statements prescribe few procedural safeguards to ensure that this
objective is achieved."); Herman, 66 S Cal L Rev at 315 (cited in note 63) (noting that "the
Commission contented itself with simply commenting that more formal proceedings
should be required at sentencing under the guidelines and leaving it to the courts to implement this suggestion"); American College of Trial Layers, Federal Rules of Evidence
Committee, The Law of Evidence in FederalSentencingProceedings, 177 FRD 513, 514
(West 1998) (noting that "neither Congress (in the SRA) nor the Commission (in the
Guidelines) addressed in any detail critical evidentiary issues such as burdens of proof,
admissibility of evidence, confrontation rights and hearing procedures").
69 See, for example, Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 19782003, in Michael Tonry, ed, 32 Cime and Justice 131 (2005) (detailing the evolving expressed and functional purposes pursued in Minnesota's sentencing guidelines system).
70 See Richard S. Frase, Is GuidedDiscretion Sufflcient? Overview of State Sentenc-
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sentencing, however, state legislatures and commissions largely
have failed to articulate a clear modern theory for sentencing,7 1
and also have failed to develop truly modern procedures for sentencing decisionmaking v2 Through new sentencing laws constraining judicial sentencing discretion and abolishing or reforming parole, the states directly or indirectly have repudiated or
reformed many tenets and practices of the old rehabilitative sentencing concept. As in the federal system, however, the sentencing revolution in the states rejected the old conceptual sentencing model without developing a clear new one to take its place.
III. THE CONCEPTUALLY-TORTURED JURISPRUDENTIAL PATH TO
BLAKELYAND BOOKER

Though federal and state legislatures and sentencing commissions adopted modern sentencing laws at a rapid pace, the
sentencing revolution took quite some time to reach and impact
the United States Supreme Court. Despite an obvious shift in
sentencing philosophies and structures,7 3 and despite the fact
that the Supreme Court's prior approval of limited procedural
rights at sentencing had been justified on the basis of a now repudiated rehabilitation-oriented sentencing philosophy," the Supreme Court through the 1980s and 1990s continued to sanction
an administrative model of sentencing decisionmaking in which
ing Guidelines, 44 SLU L J 425, 431-32 (2000) (discussing initial goals of most state
sentencing reforms in terms of disparity reduction); Barbara S. Barrett, Sentencing
Guidelines:Recommendations for Sentencing Reform, 57 Mo L Rev 1077, 1078-81 (1992)
(discussing how the rejection of the sentencing goal of rehabilitation motivated modem
reforms).
71 See, for example, Michael Vitiello and Clark Kelso, A Proposal for a Wholesale
Reform of California's Sentencing Practice and Policy, 38 Loyola LA L Rev 903, 917
(2004) ("Criminal sentencing in California is without a coherent penal theory [as] a result
of multiple layers of criminal sentencing that have come about over almost thirty years of
legislative changes to sentencing laws."). Though many states now have legislative provisions articulating the purposes for state sentencing, these statutes often list a great many
purposes and provide no guidance concerning how competing purposes should be considered or balanced. See, for example, Mont Code Ann § 46-18-101 (2003); Ohio Rev Code
Ann § 2929.11 (West 1997); Tenn Code Ann § 40-35-102 (2004). See also Kevin Reitz,
Model Penal Code: Sentencing 1, 71 (ALI 2003) (noting that most states take a "'multiple
choice' or 'laundry list' approach" to sentencing purposes).
72 See, for example, Commonwealth vHartz, 532 A2d 1139, 1157-58 (Pa Super 1987)
(noting the failure of Pennsylvania guidelines to provide specified burden of proof for
sentencing enhancement); People v Williams, 599 NE2d 913, 921 (Ill 1992) (noting the
absence of language inthe Illinois sentencing statute specifying burden of proof).
73 As early as 1981, Professor Frances Allen was already discussing the "wide and
precipitous decline of penal rehabilitationism" as a foundational theory for the criminal
justice system. Allen, The Decline of the RehabilitativeIdealat 7 (cited in note 9).
74 See Part I.
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defendants had very limited procedural rights. As detailed below,
in a series of cases, the Supreme Court repeatedly reaffirmed its
decision in Williams and repeatedly ruled that criminal sentencings were to be subject to far less procedural regulation than
criminal trials. And the Court adhered to the old administrative
procedural model for sentencing despite contentions by defendants and commentators that modern sentencing reforms had
eliminated the philosophical foundation for that model.
But then, all of a sudden, almost as if a mysterious fin-desiclie doctrinal lightswitch were flipped, the Supreme Court's
sentencing jurisprudence abruptly changed course, and the
Court started to express considerable concerns with administrative sentencing procedures. This new jurisprudence first surfaced
in Almendarez-Torres v United Statei 5 and Jones v United
States,76 then formally shook the world of sentencing in 2000
with the Supreme Court's "watershed" ruling in Apprendi v New
77
Jersey.
This new jurisprudence recently has culminated with
the "earthquake" decision in Blakel. 8 and the federal "aftershock" of Booker.
As Part IV details below, there are commendable aspects of
the Supreme Court's new sentencing jurisprudence, though
many commentators have understandably criticized the cases
culminating in Blakely and Booker as suffering from a form of
jurisprudential extremism and short-sightedness. These criticisms result in part from the fact that perhaps the only consistent hallmark of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence since the
start of the sentencing revolution has been a lack of conceptual
depth and nuance.

15

523 US 224 (1998).

76 526 US 227 (1999).
77 530 US 466 (2000). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing in dissent in Apprendi,

is to be credited with using the term "watershed" to describe the majority's decision. Id at
524 (O'Connor dissenting) (asserting that the Apprendi decision "will surely be remembered as a watershed change in constitutional law").
78 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor also gets credit for using the earthquake metaphor
to describe Blakely, see Senate, Judges Urge Blakely'Redux, NY L J at 2 (July 26, 2004)
(quoting Justice O'Connor's comment at the Ninth Circuit's annual conference in July
2004 that the Blakely case "looks like a No. 10 earthquake"), although I have been analogizing Blakely to an earthquake that has shaken the foundation of structured sentencing
reforms since soon after the decision. See Douglas A. Berman, et al, Go Slow: A Recommendation for Responding to Blakely v. Washington in the FederalSystem, Written Testimony Submitted to the Senate JudiciaryCommittee at 1 (July 13, 2004) (referring to
the Courts decision in Blakely as a "legal earthquake"); Douglas A. Berman, Examining
the Blakely Earthquake andIts Aftershocks, 16 Fed Sent Rptr 307 (2004).
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A. An Initial Failure to Respond to the Revolution: McMillan
and Federal Guidelines Cases
The Supreme Court's 1986 decision in McMillan v Pennsylvania9 was a key opening moment in the troubled evolution of
the Court's modern sentencing jurisprudence. Litigated during
the early development of structured sentencing reforms,
McMillan involved a constitutional challenge to Pennsylvania's
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, which provided for the
imposition of a five-year mandatory minimum sentence if a judge
found, by a preponderance of evidence, that an offender visibly
possessed a firearm during the commission of certain offenses."0
The defendant in McMillan argued that the Constitution required treating the fact of firearm possession as an offense element with the traditional trial procedures of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to a jury."'
Significantly, the Pennsylvania Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act at issue in McMillan clearly was not enacted in service to the rehabilitative ideal, and the focus of the Act was exclusively on the offense and not on the offender. As the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania explained in its consideration of
McMillan's claims, the Pennsylvania legislature created the
mandatory minimum provision "to protect the public from armed
criminals and to deter violent crime and the illegal use of firearms generally, as well as to vindicate its interest in punishing
those who commit serious crimes with guns." 2 The United States
Supreme Court in McMillan was thus called upon to examine a
new type of punitive sentencing provision-one in which the philosophical justifications for the administrative procedures sanctioned in Williams were no longer present. The Court could not
possibly contend or believe, as it reasonably did nearly forty
years earlier in Williams, that limiting defendants' procedural
rights in this new setting ultimately could help defendants "be
less severely punished and restored sooner to complete freedom
and useful citizenship."" Nor could the Court contend or believe,
as it had nearly ten years earlier in Grayson, that broad judicial

79 477 US 79 (1986).
80

See id at 81-82 and n 1 (quoting provisions and describing operation of Pennsyl-

vania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act).
81

Id at 84.

82 Commonwealth v Wright, 494 A2d 354, 362 (Pa 1985), affd, 477 US 79 (1986).
83

Wiiams, 337 US at 249.
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sentencing power was necessary in this new context for consideration of "the defendant's whole person and personality."'
The United States Supreme Court nevertheless turned back
McMillan's challenges to Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing Act in an opinion that largely echoed the Williams
decision without any revised justifications. The McMillan Court,
emphasizing that it is "normally within the power of the State to
regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out, including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion, " " rejected the claim that visible possession of a firearm
must be treated procedurally as an element. The Court supported its ruling with the cursory assertion that Pennsylvania's
statute "gives no impression of having been tailored to permit the
visible possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the
substantive offense." 6 The Court even rebuffed McMillan's
suggestion that the Due Process Clause required at least that
visible firearm possession be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Here the Court cited Williams for the proposition that
"sentencing courts have traditionally heard evidence and found
facts without any prescribed burden at all," and suggested that it
would be inappropriate to "constitutionaliz[e] burdens of proof at
sentencing."87
The McMilan Court provided no substantive justification or
explanation for why the administrative procedures that may
have been sensible and were deemed constitutionally sufficient
for an offender-oriented rehabilitative model of punishment in
Williams were still sensible and constitutionally sufficient for a
new offense-focused sentencing law that sought to punish and
deter. Coining the term "sentencing factor," the McMillan Court
simply asserted, without any conceptual discussion of sentencing
84
85

Grayson, 438 US at 53.
McMillan, 477 US at 85 (citation omitted). The McMllan Court's discussion of

these matters, and its emphasis on state authority to define crimes and attendant procedures, drew heavily on two cases from a decade earlier, Mulaney v Wilbur, 421 US 684
(1975), and Patterson v New York, 432 US 197 (1977), in which the Supreme Court
struggled to define limits for how states could structure affirmative defenses in the application of criminal laws. According to the McMillan court, the upshot of these cases was a
rejection of "the claim that whenever a State links the 'severity of punishment' to the
'presence or absence of an identified fact' the State must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt." McMillan, 477 US at 84 (citation omitted). Consider Kate Stith, Crime and
Punis ment under the Constitution,2004 S Ct Rev 221, 226-29 (2004) (discussing holdings and the import of Mulaney and Patterson in the Supreme Court's sentencing
jurisprudence); Joseph L. Hoffmann, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future 38 Am
Crim L Rev 255, 269-72 (2001) (same).
86 McMillan, 477 US at 88.
87 Id at 91-92.
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theories or procedures, that Pennsylvania's decision to dictate
the "precise weight" at sentencing of firearm possession "has not
transformed against its will a sentencing factor into an 'element'
of some hypothetical 'offense.' 8 8
The one conceptual principle evident in McMillan was the
structural principle of federalism. The McMilan Court repeatedly stressed the importance of allowing state legislatures to devise approaches to sentencing without significant constitutional
limitations.5 9 The Court asserted that it "should hesitate to conclude that due process bars the State from pursuing its chosen
course in the area of defining crimes and prescribing penalties,"9
and emphasized the importance of "tolerance for a spectrum of
state procedures dealing with a common problem of law enforcement."9
Unlike the majority in McMillan, Justice Stevens engaged
conceptually the new realities of Pennsylvania's sentencing law
in his dissent. Justice Stevens emphasized that Pennsylvania's
statute "automatically mandates a punishment" for visible firearm possession, and argued that "a state legislature may not
dispense with the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt for conduct that it targets for severe criminal penalties."92
Justice Stevens asserted that "[o]nce a State defines a criminal
offense, the Due Process Clause requires it to prove any component of the prohibited transaction that gives rise to both a special
stigma and a special punishment beyond a reasonable doubt."9 3
Consequently, according to Justice Stevens, because the sentencing statute mandates lengthy incarceration for "conduct that the
Pennsylvania Legislature obviously intended to prohibit," then
"the conduct so described is an element of the criminal offense to
which the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement applies."94
s Id at 89-90.
89 Id at 84-91. In addition to the obvious impact of federalism concerns, I am inclined

to speculate that the decision in McMilan may also reflect the Supreme Court's frustration and fatigue by the mid 1980s with its own considerable efforts to constitutionally
regulate state capital sentencing procedures. Consider Robert Weisberg, Deregulating
Death, 1983 S Ct Rev 305 (noting that in the early 1980s the Supreme Court had a diminished interest in regulating capital punishment procedures).
90 McMillan, 477 US at 86.
9' Id at 90.
92 Id at 96 (Stevens dissenting).
93 Id. Writing in a separate dissent that Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined,
Justice Marshall expressly agreed with this statement in Justice Stevens's dissent.
McMillan, 477 US at 94 (Marshall dissenting).
94 McMillan, 477 US at 96 (Stevens dissenting).

THE UNIVERSITY OFCHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2005:

Rendered in 1986, at a time when many legislatures and
sentencing commissions were starting to explore and develop
sentencing reforms, McMillan could have profoundly impacted,
conceptually and practically, the shape and content of structured
sentencing-if Justice Stevens' views had carried the day, or if
the Court's opinion had suggested that the Constitution imposed
some significant procedural requirements on the sentencing
process. But with the McMillan Court instead stressing the importance of "tolerance for a spectrum of state procedures dealing
with a common problem of law enforcement," legislatures and
sentencing commissions could, and typically did, neglect procedural matters when reforming the substance of sentencing decisionmaking through structured sentencing reforms.
In the wake of McMillan, as progressively more jurisdictions
adopted forms of structured sentencing through guidelines systems or mandatory sentencing statutes, two significant trends
emerged. State courts and lower federal courts, citing McMillan
and Williams, regularly upheld against a range of constitutional
challenges various structured sentencing systems that imposed
punishment without affording defendants at sentencing the traditional procedural protections of a criminal trial.95 But, at the
same time, individual judges and academics, citing the unfairness of defendants' being subject to fact-driven guidelines sentencing determinations without significant procedural rights,
regularly lamented the continued adherence to McMilan and
96
Williams.
95 See, for example, United States v Mergerson, 995 F2d 1285, 1291-93 (5th Cir
1993); United States v Restrepo, 946 F2d 654, 657 (9th Cir 1991) (en banc); State v Rettinghaus, 591 NW2d 15, 17 (Iowa 1999); Farris v McKune, 911 P2d 177, 184 (Kan 1996);
Vega v People, 893 P2d 107, 116 (Colo 1995); State v Christie, 506 NW2d 293, 298-99
(Minn 1993); People v Eason, 458 NW2d 17, 21-24 (Mich 1990); State v Krantz, 788 P2d
298, 303 (Mont 1990).
96 See, for example, United States v Concepcion, 983 F2d 369, 395-96 (2d Cir 1992)
(Newman concurring); United States vSilverman, 976 F2d 1502, 1519, 1527-33 (6th Cir
1992) (Merritt dissenting); id at 1533-35 (Martin dissenting); United States v Galloway,
976 F2d 414, 439-42 (8th Cir 1992) (Bright dissenting, joined by Arnold, Lay, and McMillian); Mark D. Knoll and Richard G. Singer, Searchingfor the "Tailof the Dog: Finding
"Elements"ofCrimes in the Wake ofMcMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 Seattle U L Rev 1057
(1999); Benjamin J. Priester, Sentenced for a "Crime" the Government Did Not Prove:
Jones v. United States and the ConstitutionalLimitations on Factfindingby Sentencing
FactorsRather than Elements of the Offense, 61 L & Contemp Probs 249 (1998); Deborah
Young, Fact-Findingat FederalSentencing: Why the GuidelinesShould Meet the Rules,
79 Cornell L Rev 299 (1994); Sara Sun Beale, ProceduralIssues Raised by Guidelines
Sentencing: The ConstitutionalSignificance of the "Elementsof the Sentence", 35 Wm &
Mary L Rev 147 (1993); Reitz, 45 Stan L Rev 523 (cited in note 16); Herman, 66 S Cal L
Rev 289 (cited in note 63); Note, An Argument for Confrontation under the FederalSentencing Guidelines,105 Harv L Rev 1880 (1992).

RECONCEPTUALIZING SENTENCING

The U.S. Supreme Court itself before long was swept up in
these trends, primarily because the structure and operation of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines heightened the importance of
sentencing factfinding while also highlighting the absence of procedural safeguards at sentencing. After upholding the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act against structural com9 7 the Supreme Court began
plaints in Mistretta v United States,
regularly confronting claims that certain aspects of sentencing
under the Federal Guidelines were constitutionally problematic
because of defendants' limited procedural rights.
Though the Supreme Court initially rebuffed most of these
claims simply by denying certiorari,98 the sheer number and significance of the procedural issues that impacted federal guideline
sentencing meant that the Court could not long avoid weighing
in on these matters. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court
consistently rejected defendants' claims that guideline procedures were constitutionally problematic, and repudiated defendants' arguments for expanding the procedural rights available
during sentencing under the Federal Guidelines.
In Wade v United States,9 9 for example, the Court held that,
absent a "substantial threshold showing" of discriminatory behavior, a defendant has "no right to discovery or an evidentiary
hearing" to explore a prosecutor's reasons for refusing to recommend a reduced sentence based on the defendant's cooperation
with authorities."' 0 In United States v Dunnigan,0 z the Court
upheld a sentence enhancement based on judicial finding of perjury at trial, stating that the fact the "enhancement stems from a
congressional mandate rather than from a court's discretionary
judgment cannot be grounds . .. for its invalidation."1" 2 In Nich97 488 US 361 (1989).
9s Consider Kinder v United States, 504 US 946, 947-50 (1992) (White dissenting

from denial of certiorari).
99 504 US 181 (1992).
100 Id at 186-87.
101 507 US 87 (1993).
102 Id at 98. The Dunnigan Court notably did engage in a brief discussion of punishment theory in response to the defendant's argument that the Supreme Court's prior
approval of considering perjury at sentencing in Grayson, 438 US 41, was premised on
the rehabilitative model of sentencing. Dunnigan,507 US at 96-98. The Dunnigan Court,
after summarily asserting that a sentence enhancement based on perjury "furthers legitimate sentencing goals relating to the principal crime, including the goals of retribution and incapacitation," distinguished Grayson with these two cursory sentences:
Our lengthy discussion in Grayson of how a defendant's perjury was relevant to the
potential for rehabilitation, however, was not meant to imply that rehabilitation
was the only permissible justification for an increased sentence based on perjury. As
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ols v United States,1" 3 the Court citing both Williams and
McMillan, stressed that the "traditional understanding of the
sentencing process [is] . .. less exacting than the process of es-

tablishing guilt," and held that a sentencing court may consider
a defendant's previous uncounseled misdemeanor conviction
when sentencing him for a subsequent offense.1 °4 In Witte v
United States,1°5 the Court again placed heavy reliance on Williams and McMillan and the fact that sentencing courts traditionally have considered a wide range of information without the
procedural protections of a criminal trial to hold that there was
no double jeopardy violation when a prior conviction increased
punishment through sentence calculations under the Federal
Guidelines.106

As in McMillan, the Supreme Court in this line of federal
guideline cases consistently relied on tradition and precedent to
support judge-centered administrative sentencing procedures.
The Court never demanded that the government offer a compelling (or really any) conceptual justification for administering a
punitive offense-focused federal sentencing system without providing defendants with traditional adversarial procedures.
This line of cases reached its high-water mark, and demonstrated a telling disregard for traditional adversarial processes,
with the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in United States v
Watts.107 In Watts, the Court constitutionally blessed the Federal
Guidelines provisions that require judges to enhance defendants'
sentences based on conduct underlying charges of which they
have been acquitted, if the government establishes that conduct
by a preponderance of the evidence.0 8 Remarkably, to justify this
ruling, the Watts Court parroted the statement in Williams that
it is essential to selection of an appropriate sentence that a judge
have "possession of the fullest information possible concerning
the defendant's life and characteristics." But the Watts Court
failed to discuss or even acknowledge: (1) that the Williams
Court made this statement in service to the rehabilitative model
of sentencing, and (2) that the Federal Guideline at issue conwe have said, the [perjury] enhancement serves other legitimate sentencing goals.
Id at 98.
103 511 US 738 (1994).
104

Id at 747.

105

515 US 389 (1995).

106

Id at 399-401.

107

519 US 148 (1997).

108 Id at 157.
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cerned only offense conduct and not any broader aspects of the
offender's "life and characteristics." 10 9
The Watts Court, again without any conceptual discussion of
the impact of a new sentencing structure, stressed the "significance of the different standards of proof that govern at trial and
sentencing" and noted that "under the pre-Guidelines sentencing
regime, it was 'well established that a sentencing judge may take
into account facts introduced at trial relating to other charges,
even ones of which the defendant has been acquitted.'" 110 Continuing to act as if the sentencing revolution never happened-or
at least as if the revolution had absolutely no significance to the
constitutional inquiry-the Watts Court held that it was permissible for the Guidelines to mandate an increase in a defendant's
punishment based on "conduct underlying the acquitted charge,
so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of
the evidence.""'
Throughout the line of federal sentencing cases culminating
in Watts, a few Justices noted that the transformation of sentencing under the Guidelines raised questions about continued
approval of the administrative procedures sanctioned in the context of the rehabilitation-oriented pre-Guidelines model of sentencing." 2 But only Justice Stevens, by repeatedly assailing the
application of pre-Guidelines precedents to sustain the limited
procedural rights afforded to defendants under the Guidelines,
addressed the underlying conceptual realities of the sentencing
revolution that had produced the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
In his dissent in Witte, for example, Justice Stevens stressed
"the change in sentencing practices caused by the Guidelines"
and argued that there were double jeopardy concerns when a
prior conviction was used to increase punishment in Guidelines
calculations. 113 And in his Watts dissent, Justice Stevens astutely
noted that the "goals of rehabilitation and fairness served by individualized sentencing that formerly justified vesting judges
with virtually unreviewable sentencing discretion have been replaced by the impersonal interest in uniformity and retribution."" 4 Justice Stevens in Watts also complained about the
109
10

Id at 151-52.
Id at 155, 152.

111 Watts, 519 US at 157.
112 See, for example, id at 170-71 (Kennedy dissenting); Nichols, 511 US at 754-63
(Blackmun dissenting).
Witte, 515 US at 409-11 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).
11
114 Watts, 519 US at 159 (Stevens dissenting).
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Court's continued reliance on Williams, since "its rationale depended largely on agreement with an individualized sentencing
regime that is significantly different from the Guidelines system."" Invoking broad conceptual principles, Justice Stevens
closed his Watts dissent by stressing the "longstanding procedural requirements enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence" and by asserting that the "notion that a charge that cannot be sustained by proof beyond a reasonable doubt may give
rise to the same punishment as if it had been so proved is repugnant to that jurisprudence."" 6 But no other Justice joined Justice
Stevens in these dissents; he was, at the time, a lone voice decrying the Court's failure to reform its sentencing jurisprudence in
light of new sentencing realities.
B.

A Reaction to the Revolution?: A Sudden and Extreme
Jurisprudential Shift

Justice Stevens's dissents in Watts and Witte clearly foreshadowed his vote and his opinion for the Court in Appren hi the
critical precursor to the Blakely and Booker decisions. But the
fact that Justice Stevens's dissents did not garner any other
votes at the time seemed to indicate that the Court's continued
application of pre-Guidelines sentencing precedents to the revolutionary new world of structured sentencing troubled only one
Justice.
Aided by hindsight, it now appears that a number of Justices
may have been impacted by cases throughout the 1990s that
highlighted the consequences of reliance on judge-centered administrative sentencing procedures after the sentencing revolution had turned sentencing decisionmaking into a more trial-like
enterprise. In Almendarez-Torres and Jones, a significant and
consequential number of Supreme Court Justices started to express serious concerns with judge-centered administrative sentencing procedures.
In 1998, the Supreme Court in Almendarez-Torres considered whether evidence of a defendant's prior convictions could be
used to increase a sentence without being subject to the procedural rules for elements of crimes at trial. Especially in light of
recent decisions in Watts and Witte, the defendant's claim for the
application of traditional trial procedures seemed to run against
115
116

Id at 165.
Id at 169, 170.
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all the Court's recent sentencing jurisprudence. The Court in
Almendarez-Torres ultimately concluded that evidence of a defendant's prior convictions could be used to increase a sentence
without being alleged in an indictment,1 17 but the 5-4 division of
the Court in Aimendarez-Torres, as well as Justice Scalia's
strong dissent asserting that the Court's holding raised serious
constitutional problems, were harbingers of decisions to come." 8
The following term, in Jones, five Justices suggested that
Almendarez-Torres announced a prior conviction exception to a
rule that facts establishing higher penalties must be treated procedurally as offense elements."1 9 The Jones Court asserted that
"a set of constitutional concerns that have emerged through a
series of our decisions over the past quarter century" 120 suggests
that "under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and
the notice and jury-trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment,
any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment,
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."'
Then, in 2000, the same five Justices voted in Apprendi to
convert the Jones Court's dicta into what Justice O'Connor, in
dissent, called a "watershed" ruling. 2 2 The Apprendi Court declared unconstitutional a New Jersey hate-crime enhancement
that enabled a sentencing judge to impose a sentence higher
than the otherwise-available statutory maximum for various
crimes based on a finding by a preponderance of the evidence
that an offense involved racial animus.123 The Apprendi Court
asserted that the hate-crime statute was constitutionally problematic because "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
submitted to a jury, and proved bestatutory maximum must be
24
doubt."
yond a reasonable
117 523 US at 226-27.
118 Joining Justice Scalia's dissent in Almendarez-Torres were Justices Stevens,
Souter and Ginsburg. See id at 248-71 (Scalia dissenting).
119 526 US at 235. The Jones majority, which was comprised of Justices Stevens,
Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, avoided an express constitutional holding by interpreting the statute at issue in Jones to comply with the suggested constitutional rule.
See id at 232-39.
120 Id at 251 n 11.
121 Id at 243 n 6.
122 See Apprendi, 530 US at 524 (O'Connor dissenting) (asserting that, because the
Apprendidecision "imposes as a constitutional rule the principle first identified in Jones,"
it "will surely be remembered as a watershed change in constitutional law").
123 Id at 497.
124 See id at 490.
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At the time that it was decided, observers of modern sentencing reforms realized that, by finally establishing a constitutional limitation on the procedures attending a legislative sentencing scheme, Apprendi was a landmark decision. 25 But perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the rulings culminating in
the Apprendi decision was their divergence from the United
States Supreme Court's sentencing jurisprudence of the prior
half-century as well as the Court's continued failure to engage
conceptually with the sentencing revolution. As detailed above,
in numerous cases challenging sentencing laws and procedures,
from Williams in 1949 through Watts in 1997, the Supreme
Court consistently upheld a wide array of sentencing systems
and practices while commanding considerable deference to legislative judgments in the sentencing arena.'26 The Supreme Court
then dramatically held in Apprendi not merely that some sentencing procedures are constitutionally required, but that any
and every fact (other than the fact of a prior conviction) that
raises a statutory maximum sentence must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'27 The Apprendi
Court even stated that "it is arguable that Aimendarez-Torres"the decision from just two years earlier that supplied the prior
conviction exception to Apprendis elements rule-"was incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning
1 28
today should apply if the recidivist issue were contested."
Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Apprendi intimated
that the Court's ruling was "a matter of simple justice,"'29 and
claimed that the ruling was a straightforward and sensible extension of an established legal history and constitutional precedents concerning what aspects of a crime must be treated as
"elements" with the full panoply of procedural protections.1 30 But
125 See, for example, Bibas, 110 Yale L J 1097 (cited in note 3); Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Due Process,History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 Am Crim L Rev 243 (2001); Benjamin J. Priester, ConstitutionalFormalismand the Meaning ofApprendi v. New Jersey,
38 Am Crim L Rev 281 (2001); Nancy J. King and Susan R. Klein, EssentialElements, 54
Vand L Rev 1467 (2001); Alan C. Michaels, Truth in Convicting: Understandingand
EvaluatingApprendi, 12 Fed Sent Rptr 320 (2000); Nancy J. King and Susan R. Klein,
Apr~sApprendi, 12 Fed Sent Rptr 331 (2000).
126 See notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
127 Apprendi, 530 US at 490. See also id at 539, 525 (O'Connor dissenting) (lamenting
that the Apprendi decision is "a substantial departure from our settled jurisprudence"
through which the Court "casts aside our traditional cautious approach and instead embraces a universal and seemingly bright-line rule").
128 See id at 489-90.
129 Id at 476.
130 Apprendi, 530 US at 492.
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the 5-4 vote of the Justices in Apprendi, the length and contentiousness of the five separate opinions, and the particularly
strenuous dissents of Justices O'Connor and Breyer, revealed
that the Apprendi decision was anything but "simple" and that
the majority's reading of history and precedent was quite contestable.1 3 '
In previous writings I have suggested that Apprendi can be
viewed as the inevitable product of pressures from the intersection of the Supreme Court's own revolution of criminal trial procedures and sentencing reformers' revolution of the substance of
sentencing laws.' 3 2 As some commentators have noted, structured sentencing reforms-particularly because they have tended
to make sentencing determinations more offense-oriented and
fact-driven-have transformed sentencing decisionmaking into a
more trial-like enterprise. 3 ' This reality--combined particularly
with the fact that a large percentage of cases resolve through
guilty pleas and thus sentencing often serves as the only triallike procedure for most defendants' 3 4 -- 1ikely prodded the Supreme Court to place some limits on how much of criminal justice
decisionmaking could be relegated to the lax administrative procedures that historically have governed at sentencing. 3 '
131 See id at 525 (O'Connor dissenting) ("In its opinion, the Court marshals virtually
no authority to support is extraordinary rule."); id at 555 (Breyer dissenting) ("At the very
least, the impractical nature of the requirement that the majority now recognizes supports the proposition that the Constitution was not intended to embody it."). See also
Rory K Little and Teresa Chen, The Lost History ofApprendi and the Blakely Petition
for Rehearing,17 Fed Sent Rptr 69 (2004) (disputing the historical story that the majority tells in Appren d).
132 See Berman, 37 Crim L Bull at 627-45 (cited in note 62) (concluding that Apprendi
"demonstrates that sentencing reformers cannot disregard procedures while transforming
the substance of sentencing and expect the Supreme Court to continue to blindly approve
of sentencing systems which seem to have the potential to undermine what are now considered the basic procedural tenets of the modern criminal justice system").
133 Consider Hoffmann, 38 Am Crim L Rev at 267-68 (cited in note 85); Young, 79
Cornell L Rev at 364-71 (cited in note 97); Beale, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev at 158 (cited in
note 96); Reitz, 45 Stan L Rev at 148-59 (cited in note 16); Herman, 66 S Cal L Rev at
342-55 (cited in note 63); Note, 105 Harv L Rev at 1888-91 (cited in note 96).
134 See Bibas, 110 Yale L J at 1149-50 (cited in note 3) (stressing the significance of
the prevalence of guilty pleas in the criminal justice system and the appropriateness of
more fully developed procedural rules at sentencing); United States v Green, 346 F Supp
2d 259, 264-79 (D Mass 2004) (detailing the centrality of plea agreements and plea bargaining in the operation of the federal criminal justice system and suggesting these realities justify greater procedural rights at sentencing for defendants).
135 Professor Hoffmann made a similar observation in an article written after Apprendi.
Th[e] evolution in both the form and substance of sentencing hearings undoubtedly
influenced the Court to see sentencing hearings as more like guilt/innocence trials
than before [and] seems to be reflected in the Court's abrupt change of direction in
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But Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court in Appren h,unfortunately, did not grapple conceptually with the impact of the
sentencing revolution on the Supreme Court's sentencing jurisprudence. Nor did Justice Stevens fully engage the important
conceptual ideas that he had developed in his McMillan and
Watts dissents.'36 In Apprendi, Justice Stevens did not highlight,
as he had in Watts, that the Williams Court's approval of administrative sentencing procedures was the product of its commitment to an old, offender-oriented rehabilitative sentencing theory. Rather, Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court in Apprendi
essentially reaffirmed Wifliamds holding that judges permissibly
could exercise broad discretion when "imposing sentence within
statutorylimits in the individual case."13 7
Moreover, though Apprendis holding seemed to vindicate
Justice Stevens's assertion in his McMillan dissent that a state
should have "to prove any component of the prohibited transaction that gives rise to both a special stigma and a special punishment beyond a reasonable doubt," 3 ' his opinion for the Court
in Apprendi merely distinguished McMillan as dealing only with
mandatory minimum sentences and not with available maximum
sentences." 9 Consequently, though Apprendi created a significant constitutional limitation on sentencing procedures, the Apprendi Court failed to provide a clear conceptual justification for
why judge-centered administrative sentencing procedures, which
had been constitutionally blessed for so long, were now constitutionally-impermissible whenever a fact (other than a prior conviction) increased the applicable maximum sentence.
In short, then, the outcome in Apprendi seemed to reflect the
impact of the sentencing revolution, but the majority opinion in
Apprendi barely even acknowledged that this revolution had occurred. 4 ° The dissents of Justices O'Connor and Breyer in ApApprendi In short, as an unintended consequence of the recent move from discretionary to determinate sentencing, sentencing hearings have begun to look more
and more like adversarial proceedings, which in turn has helped to ensure that they
will be treated, for constitutional purposes, more and more like adversarial proceedings. Apprend; in other words, is a natural and perhaps even predictable consequence of the recent trend toward adversarial-ness in sentencing.
Hoffmann, 38 Am Crim L Rev at 267-68 (cited in note 85).
136

See McMillan, 477 US at 96 (Stevens dissenting); Watts, 519 US at 159, 169-70

(Stevens dissenting).
137 Appren, 530 US at 481 (emphasis in original).
138 McMillan, 477 US at 96 (Stevens dissenting).
139 Apprend, 530 US at 485-87.
140 In a final footnote, as a response to the principal dissent's "lengthy disquisition on
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prendi,however, directly engaged the modern sentencing revolution. Both Justices expressed, often in dramatic language, their
distress over the prospect that the Apprendi decision could "invalidate with the stroke of a pen three decades' worth of nationwide reform." ' Expressing their concerns with the majority's
holding, the Apprendi dissenters highlighted in various ways
that the Apprendi decision was conceptually opaque 4 2 (although
the dissenters' arguments for a different rule seemed based more
on pragmatism than on principle4 .).
C.

A Counter-Reaction to the Revolution?: An Effort to Rein in
the New Jurisprudence

The meaning and import of the Supreme Court's decision in
Apprendi was hotly debated as soon as the Court handed it
down,' in part because the Court's conceptually unclear opinion
raised many questions and provided little guidance for lower
courts and legislatures needing to make sense of and apply Apprendis watershed rule that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."14 5 As the Apprendi dis147
46
senters had warned,' and as many commentators have noted,
the benefits of determinate sentencing schemes" and its discussion of the federal guidelines, the Apprendi majority ominously and somewhat confusingly stated that it expressed "no view on the subject [of the federal guidelines] beyond what this Court has
already held." Id at 497 n 21.
141 Id at 550 (O'Connor dissenting).
142 See id at 547 ("Although the Court acknowledges the legitimacy of discretionary
sentencing by judges... it never provides a sound reason for treating judicial factfinding
under determinate-sentencing schemes differently under the Constitution."). See also
Apprendi, 530 US at 563-64 (Breyer dissenting) (expressing puzzlement over the way
that the Apprendi majority distinguished McMillan).
143 See Apprend 530 US at 550 (O'Connor dissenting) (asserting that "the most significant impact of the Court's decision will be a practical one-its unsettling effect on
sentencing conducted under current federal and state determinate-sentencing schemes");
id at 555 (Breyer dissenting) (assailing the "impractical nature of the requirement that
the majority now recognizes").
144 Within a year of the Apprendi decision, in addition to numerous academic and
practitioner articles examining Apprend, see note 137, there had already been at least
three major scholarly symposia devoted to examining Apprendi. See Assessing Apprendi,
12 Fed Sent Rptr 301 (2000); Symposium: Reflections on the ConsequencesofApprendi v.
New Jersey, 37 Crim L Bull 552 (2001); Apprendi Symposium, 38 Am Crim L Rev 241
(2001).
145 Apprendi, 530 US at 490.
146 See id at 550 (O'Connor dissenting); id at 565 (Breyer dissenting).
147 See, for example, Jane A. Dall, Note, "A Question for Another Day". The Constitutionality of the US Sentencing Guidelines Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 78 Notre
Dame L Rev 1617 (2003); Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the FederalSentenc-
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the Apprendi decision cast constitutional doubt on many sentencing statutes and guidelines enacted during the modern sentencing reform movement. Most structured and guideline sentencing
reforms were built around judicial factfinding without traditionnal trial procedures-a sentencing process which the Supreme
Court in a series of cases had previously approved, but in Apprendisuggested was constitutionally-problematic.
The Apprendi decision, however, initially had a smaller impact than the dissenters and many observers may have expected.
Although the decision generated much litigation,14 8 Apprendis
direct effect on established criminal sentencing laws was relatively limited. Lower federal and state courts typically interpreted Apprendi narrowly in order to preserve, as much as possible, existing sentencing structures that relied on judicial factfinding,14 9 and legislatures did not feel compelled to alter existing
sentencing systems or criminal codes in light of Apprendi'5 °
The Supreme Court itself restricted the reach and impact of
15 1
Apprendi through its decision in United States v Harris.
In
Harris,the Court examined anew the issue that it previously had
addressed in McMillan, namely the procedures constitutionally
required when a statute specifies a mandatory minimum sentencing term. The Apprendi majority opinion had distinguished
McMillan, but the Court accepted certiorari in Harris because
there was an obvious tension between Apprendls "elements" rule
for facts that raise available maximum sentences and McMillan's
holding that facts that trigger mandatory minimum sentences
could be found by a judge using a preponderance standard of
proof.15 2 Though in his Harrisconcurrence Justice Breyer caning Guidelines: You Say You Want a Revolution, 87 Iowa L Rev 615 (2002); Jeffrey
Standen, The End of the Era of Sentencing Guidelines:Apprendi v. New Jersey, 87 Iowa
L Rev 775 (2002).
148 See, for example, King and Klein, 12 Fed Sent Rptr at 331-32 (cited in note 125)
(detailing some of the immediate post-Apprendi lower court litigation); Hoffmann, 38 Am
Crim L Rev at 255 (cited in note 85) (noting that there were more than 400 reported federal and state court decisions dealing with Apprendi issues within a year of the Supreme
Court's decision).
149 Consider Stephanos Bibas, Apprendi in the States: The Virtues of Federahsmas a
Structura Lirmit on Errors,94 J Crim L & Criminol 1 (2003).
150 The one exception to this story comes from Kansas, where the Kansas Supreme
Court held after Apprendi that its judicially-administered sentencing guidelines system
was constitutionally problematic. See State v Gould, 23 P3d 801, 814 (Kan 2001); State v
Cullen, 60 P3d 933, 934-35 (Kan 2003). The Kansas legislature responded by creating
procedures for using sentencing juries to find necessary facts in certain cases. See Kan
Stat Ann § 21-4718 (1995).
151 536 US 545 (2002).
152

Id at 549-50.
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didly admitted that he could not "easily distinguish Apprendi v
New Jersey from this case in terms of logic," 153 the Supreme
Court in Harris ultimately reaffirmed McMillan.15 4 The Court
held, in another 5-4 decision, that submission to a jury or proof
beyond a reasonable doubt was not required for facts that mandated minimum penalties.'
Harris marked the first time that the Court directly discussed the sentencing revolution, noting that "in the latter part
of the 20th century, many legislatures, dissatisfied with sentencing disparities among like offenders, implemented measures
regulating judicial discretion." 56 For Justice Kennedy and the
Harrisplurality, however, this recent sentencing reform history
did not provide a conceptual reason to reconsider precedents like
Williams and McMillan; rather it provided a practical reason to
reaffirm them. Citing numerous statutes in which "Congress and
the States have conditioned mandatory minimum sentences upon
judicial findings," Justice Kennedy stated:
It is critical not to abandon [McMillan] at this late date.
Legislatures and their constituents have relied upon
McMillan to exercise control over sentencing through dozens of statutes like the one the Court approved in that
case .... We see no reason to overturn those statutes or
cast uncertainty upon the sentences imposed under
them.

15 7

Seeking to harmonize the Court's sentencing jurisprudence
to date, Justice Kennedy in Harristhus provided this summary:
Read together, McMilan and Apprendi mean that those
facts setting the outer limits of a sentence, and of the judicial power to impose it, are the elements of the crime for
the purposes of the constitutional analysis. Within the
range authorized by the jury's verdict, however, the politi153 Id at 569 (Breyer concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
154 Id at 568.
155 Harris,536 US at 568-69. On the same day that the Court decided Haris,it also
expanded Apprendls reach in Ring v Arizona, 536 US 584 (2002), by holding that capital
defendants are "entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment." Id at 588. Because most jurisdictions
already relied on jury sentencing in capital cases, however, the Court's decision in Harris
to limit the procedural requirements for imposition of minimum sentences seemed, at the
time, to be the most important and telling iteration of Apprendis scope and reach.
156Harris,536 US at 558.
157 Id at 567-68.
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cal system may channel judicial discretion-and rely upon
judicial expertise-by requiring defendants to serve
minimum terms after judges make certain factual find158
ings.
Though the HarrisCourt perhaps deserves praise for finally
acknowledging the sentencing revolution, the decision sowed
more conceptual confusion. Justice Breyer provided the key fifth
vote in Harris to keep Apprendi from applying to mandatory
minimum sentencing factfinding, but he expressly stated in his
concurrence that he could not easily see the logic of distinguish59 And Justice
ing Harris from Apprendi.1
Kennedy's assertion
that "the political system may channel judicial discretion-and
rely upon judicial expertise-by requiring defendants to serve
minimum terms after judges make certain factual findings"160 is
curious to say the least. The reference to "judicial expertise" is an
obvious throwback to the old-world sentencing model in which
judges were expected to use their unique insights to craft an individualized offender-oriented rehabilitative sentence. 6 ' But, as
Judge Nancy Gertner has astutely noted in a commentary about
Harris,within the context of modern structured sentencing systems, often "the judge is 'just' another fact finder, doing precisely
what the jury does: finding facts with specific and often harsh
sentencing consequences."162 To speak in this setting-as Justice
Kennedy did-of reliance on "judicial expertise" for making offense-based factual findings is almost nonsensical.
Despite its conceptual cloudiness, the practical consequences
of Harrisappeared mighty clear at the time. As seemed to be the
Court's goal, Haris suggested that, despite an Apprendi scare,
the structured and guidelines sentencing provisions developed
during the sentencing revolution could continue to operate with
judge-centered, administrative sentencing procedures. As Professor Stephanos Bibas put matters at the time, by holding in Harristhat only facts that raise maximum sentences must be treated
procedurally as elements, and not those that establish minimums, the Supreme Court seemed to have "caged the potentially
158 Id at 567.

159 Id at 569 (Breyer concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
160 Harris,536 US at 567.
161 See
162

Part I.

Gertner, 15 Fed Sent Rptr at 83-85 (cited in note 12). See also United States v

Mueffleman, 327 F Supp 2d at 83 (cited in note 13) (noting that, after a prosecutor makes
a variety of discretionary charging and bargaining choices, the judge's role is "transformed to 'just' finding the facts, now with Commission-ordained consequences").
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ravenous, radical Apprendi tiger that threatened to devour modern sentencing law."163
In addition to permitting guideline sentencing to continue to
rely on judicial factfinding procedures, the Court's decision in
Harrisalso seemed to eliminate the prospect for a conceptuallynuanced constitutional approach to modern sentencing procedures. Had the Harris Court more fully engaged conceptually
with the theories and structures of modern sentencing decisionmaking, the Court perhaps could have started to develop a more
refined jurisprudence of heightened due process protections at
sentencing, even as it restricted the reach of Apprendis elements
rule."6 But instead, as Judge Gertner has observed, the Court's
binary approach in Apprendi and Harris "was 'all-or-nothing': if
there is no jury trial, the 'all' of our criminal justice system, there
is next to 'nothing,' the comparative informality of sentencing."16
D.

The Blakely Earthquake and the Booker Aftershock

When the Court granted certiorari in Blakely v Washington,
most observers believed that the case was to serve as final confirmation that Apprendi would not radically transform modern
sentencing practices. After Harris,the widely-shared belief was
that the sentencing revolution had been spared from further constitutional intrusion; many thought that the Supreme Court
would use Blakely to rule, as had nearly all lower courts, that
Apprendi did not apply to judicial factfinding that impacted only
guideline sentencing outcomes within otherwise applicable statutory ranges.
But then in June 2004 the Blakely earthquake hit. Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court and on behalf of the same five Jus163 Stephanos Bibas, Back from the Brink: The Supreme Court Balks at Extending
Apprendi to UpsetMost Sentencing, 15 Fed Sent Rptr 79, 79 (2002).
164 In both Watts and Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court concluded its rejection
of the defendants' challenges to applicable sentencing procedures by suggesting that
greater due process protections might possibly be constitutionally required in some cases.
See Almendarez-Torres, 523 US at 248 (stating, after noting that the defendant in the
case at hand had "admitted his recidivism at the time he pleaded guilty," that the Court
expressed 'no view on whether some heightened standard of proof might apply to sentencing determinations that bear significantly on the severity of sentence"); Watts, 519
US at 156-57 (acknowledging "a divergence of opinion among the Circuits as to whether,
in extreme circumstances, relevant conduct that would dramatically increase the sentence must be based on clear and convincing evidence," but holding that the "cases before
us today do not present such exceptional circumstances, and we therefore do not address
that issue"). The Court in Harris did not discuss or even acknowledge this potentially
significant dicta from prior cases.
165 Gertner, 15 Fed Sent Rptr at 84 (cited in note 12).
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tices constituting the majority in Jones and Apprendi, concluded
that Ralph Blakely's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was
violated when a Washington State sentencing judge enhanced
Blakely's sentence based on the judge's factual finding that his
kidnapping offense involved "deliberate cruelty."166 Linking this
holding back to the Court's Apprendi ruling, Justice Scalia explained:
Our precedents make clear ... that the "statutory maxi-

mum" for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected
in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other
words, the relevant "statutory maximum" is not the
maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without
any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment
that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has
not found all the facts which the law makes essential to
the punishment,
and the judge exceeds his proper author167
ity.
Justice Scalia further explained that this particular articulation
of the meaning and reach of Apprendi "reflects not just respect
for longstanding precedent, but the need to give intelligible content to the right of a jury trial. That right is no mere procedural
formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure." 16' Rebuffing a range of practical concerns
expressed by the dissenters, Justice Scalia concluded his opinion
for the Court with the breathtakingly bold assertion that "every
defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor
prove to a
169
jury all facts legally essential to the punishment."
Because the Blakely decision not only redefined the reach of
Apprendi but also further suggested that any and every fact "legally essential to the punishment" must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury or admitted by the defendant, the potential impact of Blakely on modern sentencing systems is truly
staggering. Indeed, it is hard to read the opinion without believing that the Blakely majority had decided that the sentencing
revolution, which relied on judge-centered administrative sen166 Blakely, 124 S Ct at 2538.
167Id at 2537 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
166 Id at 2538-39.
169 Id at 2543 (emphasis in original).
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tencing procedures, must start granting defendants the full
panoply of jury-centered adversarial procedures.
The Blakely dissenters, not surprisingly, spoke in near cataclysmic terms about what the Blakely decision might mean. Justice O'Connor predicted that the "practical consequences of today's decision may be disastrous" because Blakely "casts constitutional doubt over [sentencing guidelines systems] and, in so
doing, threatens an untold number of criminal judgments.""v°
Justice O'Connor stated that if "the Washington scheme does not
comport with the Constitution, it is hard to imagine a guidelines
" ' and she concluded her dissent by lamentscheme that would,"17
ing that "[o]ver 20 years of sentencing reform are all but lost; and
1 72
Justens of thousands of criminal judgments are in jeopardy."
tices Kennedy and Breyer likewise expressed in dire terms their
concerns about the Blakely majority's ruling. Justice Kennedy
lamented that the decision does "considerable damage to our
laws and to the administration of the criminal justice system,"
and he suggested that the decision essentially commanded jurisdictions with sentencing guidelines systems "to scrap everything
and start over."17 3 Justice Breyer commented that he "thought
the Court might have limited Apprendi so that its underlying
principle would not undo sentencing reform efforts. Today's case
dispels that illusion."174
The potential impact of Blakely was quickly realized: within
days, Blakely began disrupting state and federal structured sentencing systems. As reflected in a rapid-fire series of lower federal court decisions, the shock waves from the Blakely earthquake were especially destructive to the operation of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, a system that has judicial factfinding
built into its very foundation. 75 Within weeks of the Blakely decision, dozens of lower federal courts had declared at least portions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional,'
170 Blakely, 124 S Ct at 2544, 2549 (O'Connor dissenting).
171

Id at 2550.

172

Id.

173 Id at 2550, 2551 (Kennedy dissenting).
174
175

Blakeiy, 124 S Ct at 2561. (Breyer dissenting).
See William W. Wilkins, Jr. and John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Corner-

stone of the FederalSentencing Guidelines,41 SC L Rev 495, 496 (1990) (describing the
.relevant conduct" provisions, which call for judicial fact-finding of offense conduct, "the
cornerstone of the federal sentencing guideline system").
176 See, for example, United States v Croxford, 324 F Supp 2d 1255 (D Utah 2004);
United States v Khan, 325 F Supp 2d 218 (E D NY 2004). Consider Nancy J. King and
Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 Fed Sent Rptr 316, 316-20 (2004) (detailing the effects of Blakely on federal criminal sentencing); Stephanos Bibas, Blakely 'a FederalAf-

36
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and the Acting Solicitor General was compelled to seek expedited
consideration in the Supreme Court of Blakells applicability to
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.1 7 7 Though the immediate
spectacle of federal sentencing chaos captured most of the newspaper headlines and academic attention in the wake of Blakely,
before long there were also major state court rulings-in California, Colorado, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, and more than a
dozen other states-suggesting that many jurisdictions might
have to significantly restructure their sentencing systems after
8
7

Blakely.1

Though the practical ramifications of Blakely were obvious,
the conceptual foundation and ultimate reach of the ruling were
opaque. From its discussion of the jury as a democratic institution, 79 to its explanation of the Sixth Amendment as a "reservation of jury power,"180 to its concluding disparagement of "the
civil-law ideal of administrative perfection," l8 ' Justice Scalia's
opinion for the Court in Blakely sketched the outlines of a conceptual argument for juries to have a significant role and authority at sentencing.8 2 But the Blakely Court undercut the conceptual clarity of its ruling by failing to explain or even examine
how its principles squared with the many precedents that previously had championed judges' role and authority at sentencing.
As in Apprendi, the Court in Blakely did not overrule or even
seriously question either the old-world, judge-centered Williams
termath, 16 Fed Sent Rptr 333 (2004) (same). Many judges not only found the Guideline
enhancements based on judicial factfinding unconstitutional, but also concluded that
these parts of the Guidelines were not severable from the rest of the federal sentencing
system. Consequently, some federal judges ruled that the entire federal guidelines system
must be legally inoperative in some or all cases. Consider Albert W. Alschuler, To Sever
or not to Sever? Wy Blakely Requires Action by Congress, 17 Fed Sent Rptr 11 (2004).
177 See Douglas A. Berman, The Solcitor GeneralSpeakst, Sentencing Law and Policy Blog (July 21, 2004), available at <http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_
and-policy/2004!07/thesolicitorg.html> (last visited Feb 6, 2005).
178 See, for example, State v Dilts, 103 P3d 95 (Or 2004); People v Barton, 2004 WL
2903510 (Colo App Dec 16, 2004); State v Hanl, 687 NW2d 659 (Minn App 2004); New
Jersey vAbduilah, 858 A2d 19 (NJ Super App 2004). Consider Jon Wool and Don Stemen,
Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington: PracticalImplicationsfor State Sentencing Systems, 17 Fed Sent Rptr 60 (2004); J. Bradley O'Connell, Amazing Stories. Blakely
v. Washington and California Determinate Sentences, 16 Fed Sent Rptr 348 (2004);
Douglas A. Berman, Blakely in the States, Sentencing Law and Policy Blog (archive),
available at <http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_lawandpolicy/blakely-in the
states/index.html> (last visited April 9, 2005).
1'9 Blakely, 124 S Ct at 2538-39.
180 Id at 2540.
181 Id at 2543.
182 See Part IV for an effort to give a conceptual account of the principles behind
Blakely.

RECONCEPTUALIZING SENTENCING

decision or the more recent judge-friendly precedents of
McMillan and Harris. Instead, the Blakely Court, in a few brief
sentences, summarily distinguished Williams, McMillan, and
Harris.' Much of Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in
Blakely, rather than seeking to provide a conceptually-cogent
account of the Supreme Court's sentencing jurisprudence, is devoted to assailing-even lampooning-the protestations of the
dissenting Justices.
The Blakely decision also demonstrated an amazing ability
to dodge, without any conceptual engagement, troublesome
precedents. The Blakely holding expressly restated Apprendis
exception for prior convictions, but Justice Scalia's opinion did
not even deign to mention or cite Almendarez-Torres, the case
from which the exception emerged. The Blakely Court also completely failed to acknowledge the 1997 Watts decision-which, by
expressly holding that judges could find facts to increase Federal
Guidelines sentences if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, seemed to conflict directly with Blakely.
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Blakely did respond
to the dissenters' concerns about the impact of the majority's ruling on modern sentencing reforms, but the response was both
spartan and conceptually tepid. Speaking in one paragraph to
these issues, Justice Scalia said simply that "we are not ... finding determinate sentencing schemes unconstitutional. This case
is not about whether determinate sentencing is constitutional,
only about how it can be implemented in a way that respects the
Sixth Amendment."" 4 In response to the dissenters' complaints
that the majority's broad ruling would render unconstitutional
fundamental provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
Justice Scalia dropped a footnote to assert simply that "The Fedare not before us, and we express no opinion on
eral Guidelines
85
them."
Because Blakely so quickly and so dramatically disrupted
federal sentencing practices, it was clear that the Supreme Court
would soon have to write the next chapter in this jurisprudential
saga. With thousands of sentencings in the federal system each
month,'86 and with many (if not most) of those sentencings turn183 Blakely, 124 S Ct at 2538.
184

Id at 2540.

185 Id at 2538 n 9.

186 The official statistics from the United States Sentencing Commission for fiscal year
2002 document nearly 65,000 federal sentencings in that year, which averages out to
more than 5,000 federal sentencings each month. United States Sentencing Commission,
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ing on judicial factfinding, s7 the Court had no choice but to consider on an expedited schedule Blakelys applicability to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Granting certiorari only six weeks
after Blakely was decided, and ordering two full hours of oral
argument for the first day of its October 2004 Term, the Supreme
Court considered directly, in Booker and United States v Fanfan,1' whether and how the rule announced in Blakely would
apply to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Three months later,
with tens of thousands of federal sentencings hanging in the balance, the Supreme Court issued a set of opinions in Booker and
Fanfan that surprised few by finding Blakely applicable to the
federal system, but surprised many by devising an unexpected
remedy for the federal system.
The Booker decision, which runs 118 pages and has two majority opinions made up of two distinct coalitions of five Justices,
is difficult to comprehend, let alone summarize. The opening
passage of Justice Stevens's opinion for the Booker Court distills
the decision:
We hold that [lower] courts correctly concluded that the
Sixth Amendment as construed in Blakely does apply to
the [Federal] Sentencing Guidelines. In a separate opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court concludes that
in light of this holding, two provisions of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) that have the effect of making
the Guidelines mandatory must be invalidated in order to
allow the statute to operate in a manner consistent with
18 9
congressional intent.
The five Justices who comprised the majorities in Apprendi and
Blakely declared in Booker that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, when instructing judges to make factual findings to calcu-

Sourcebook ofFederalSentencing StatisticsTable 1 (2003).
187 In the wake of Blakely, there was much speculation and debate over how many
federal sentencings depended upon post-verdict judicial fact-finding of aggravating sentencing facts. Though estimates ranged from as low as twenty percent to as high at sixtyfive percent, it is a safe guess to suggest that roughly half of all federal sentencings depend upon judicial fact-finding of aggravating sentencing facts under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See Douglas A. Berman, Please,Please Share Your Data USSC, Sentencing Law and Policy Blog (Sept 27, 2004), available at <http://sentencing.typepad
.com/sentencing-law-andpolicy/2004/09/please-pleases.html> (last visited Feb 15,
2005).
18 125 S Ct 738 (2005). The Supreme Court consolidated Booker and Fanfanwhen it
granted certiorari. Id at 747.
189 Id at 746.
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late increases in applicable sentencing ranges, transgressed the
Sixth Amendment jury-trial right.19 ° But the prescribed remedy
was not, as this ruling would seem to connote, a larger role for
juries in the operation of the federal sentencing system. Rather,
as a result of a defection by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a
separate group of five Justices-the Apprendi and Blakely dissenters plus Justice Ginsburg-concluded that the remedy for
this Sixth Amendment problem was to declare the Federal Sentencing Guidelines wholly advisory.
A remarkable ruling for many reasons, the Booker decision
somehow found a way to make a conceptually muddled constitutional jurisprudence of sentencing even more opaque. Through
the dual rulings of dueling majorities, the Court declared that
the federal sentencing system no longer could rely upon mandated and tightly-directed judicial factfinding. As a remedy,
however, the Court created a system relying on discretionary and
loosely-directed judicial factfinding. Thus, to culminate a jurisprudence that previously seemed interested in vindicating the
role of the jury in modern sentencing systems, Booker devised a
remedy for the federal system that granted federal judges more
sentencing power than they had ever wielded previously.
Though the peculiar logic and stunning consequences of the
Booker decision can and likely will be discussed and debated for
years to come, in this context it is important to spotlight Booke.?s
notable conceptual highlights (or lowlights). First, repeating the
pattern of Apprendi and Blakely, the Court in Booker, though
again finding unconstitutional a sentencing scheme's reliance on
judicial factfinding, did not reexamine or even question any of
the Court's precedents-from Williams to McMillan to Almendarez-Torres to Harris--that previously had embraced judicial
factfinding at sentencing. Indeed, laying the groundwork for the
remedy devised by Justice Breyer in Booker, Justice Stevens in
his portion of the Booker opinion cited both Apprendi and Williams to espouse that the Court has "never doubted the authority
of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence
within a statutory range."19 1 Thus, even as Justice Stevens's
opinion for the "merits majority" in Booker championed the importance of "enforcement of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
a jury trial in today's world," 9 2 his opinion provided a ready
190 Booker, 125 S Ct at 750-52.
191 Id at 750.

192 Id at 751.
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means for eviscerating that guarantee through broad grants of
discretionary authority to sentencing judges.
The opinion of Justice Stevens for the Court in Booker does
discuss expressly the impact of modern sentencing reforms on
defendants' procedural rights and on the Court's constitutional
jurisprudence. Addressing the "new trend in the legislative regulation of sentencing," Justice Stevens highlighted that the "effect
of the increasing emphasis on facts that enhanced sentencing
ranges... was to increase the judge's power and diminish that of
the jury ....
[As] the enhancements became greater, the jury's
finding of the underlying crime became less significant."1 93 Consequently, continued Justice Stevens,
[T[he Court was faced with the issue of preserving an ancient guarantee under a new set of circumstances. The
new sentencing practice forced the Court to address the
question how the right of jury trial could be preserved, in
a meaningful way guaranteeing that the jury would still
stand between the individual and the power of the government under the new sentencing regime. And it is the
new circumstances, not a tradition or practice that the
new circumstances have superseded, that have led us to
the answer first considered in Jones and developed in Apprendiand subsequent cases culminating with this one. It
is an answer not motivated by Sixth Amendment formalism but by the need to preserve Sixth Amendment substance. 94
Through this passage, the United States Supreme Court, to its
credit, finally explained that its new Sixth Amendment jurisprudence reflects a reaction to the revolution in sentencing law and
practice engendered by modern statutory and guidelines reforms.
But though the Court finally engaged conceptually with the sentencing revolution, Justice Stevens's opinion still constitutionally
blessed judge-centered discretionary sentence decisionmaking
and failed to acknowledge that the historical approval in cases
like Williams of lax procedural rights at sentencing had been
premised expressly on the rehabilitative "medical model" that
had been dominant before modem reforms.' 9
193 Id.

194 Booker, 125 S Ct at 752.
195 As evidenced by his dissents in cases like McMilan and Watts, see McMillan, 477
US at 96 (Stevens dissenting); Watts, 519 US at 159, 169-70 (Stevens dissenting), Justice

RECONCEPTUALIZING SENTENCING

Thus, while the Booker merits-majority is to be praised for
its express consideration of modern sentencing reforms, so much
more could have been said-indeed, needed to be said-to provide greater conceptual clarity in this arena. Justice Stevens
wrote insightfully and eloquently of "the need to preserve Sixth
Amendment substance" in the modern sentencing era, but the
Court failed to grapple with key precedents that impeding that
goal. And Justice Breyer's remedy in Booker, which crafts a revised federal sentencing system that still relies fully on judgecentered administrative sentencing procedures, dramatically undercuts any serious effort to truly "preserve Sixth Amendment
substance."
IV. TAKING STOCK AND MOVING FORWARD CONCEPTUALLY

A month after Blakely was handed down, Justice O'Connor
described the Supreme Court's decision as a "No. 10 earthquake."'96 Professor Frank 0. Bowman, III, one of the most astute and informed commentators on federal sentencing, called
Blakely a train wreck.' 97 Ultimately, I am not sure that any
metaphor can do justice to the Blakely decision, because, as I
stated in a commentary soon after the decision, Blakely may be
the most consequential and important criminal justice decision
not just in recent terms, not just of the Rehnquist Court, but
perhaps in the history of the Supreme Court. 9 '
Stevens himself seems ready to reconsider various aspects of Williams and its approval of
lax procedures within a discretionary sentencing system. But it would seem that in
Booker he did not have five votes for a broader reconsideration of this jurisprudence.
196 See Senate, Judges Urge Blakely' Redux, NY L J at 2 (cited in note 78).
197 See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can the FederalSentencing System
Be Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal ofBIakely v. Washington, 41 Am Crim L Rev 217
(2004). Professor Bowman's metaphorical description of Blakely is so wonderfully evocative, it merits quoting at length:
On June 24, 2004, five black-clad figures seized control of the Criminal Justice Express, crashed through warning barriers, flattened the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines, opened the throttle, and sent the train hurtling from the main line
down the old rail spur where the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the sentencing
systems of numerous states lay tied helplessly to the tracks. Whereupon, the 2003
Term of Court being concluded, the justices twirled their collective mustachios, sent
their robes off to the cleaners, and went on vacation. Two months on, as this Essay
goes to press, the rest of us stand staring slack-jawed, some delighted and some
aghast, at the disarray and paralysis in the locomotive's wake and the impending
carnage at the end of the line.
Id at 218.
19s See Douglas Berman, Supreme Court Cleanup in Aisle 4,Slate (July 16, 2004),
available at <http://slate.msn.com/id/2104014> (last visited Feb 12, 2005).
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The Booker aftershock, which effectively gutted a federal
guidelines sentencing system twenty years in the making, serves
as just the most tangible example of the way that Blakely already has and will continue to reshape the modem criminal justice landscape. Because a broad reading of Blakely suggests that
the Constitution does not permit judges to find any facts that
permit or mandate an increased sentence, even though nearly all
modern sentencing systems rely heavily on judicial factfinding,
the potential ramifications of Blakely for modern sentencing reforms, and for the criminal justice system as a whole, cannot be
overstated. "'
Unfortunately, the conceptual uncertainty and confusion
that Blakely and Booker have produced also cannot be overstated. The Blakely and Booker rulings are the dramatic culmination of a zigzagging jurisprudence over constitutionallyrequired sentencing procedures that has been conceptually underdeveloped at every point along the way.20 0 The decisions
themselves, with their sweeping dicta, notable doctrinal gaps,
and remarkable holdings, are at once majestic and mysterious,
stunning and stupefying. By preserving decisions that broadly
endorse certain types of judicial factfinding at sentencing, such
as Williams, McMillan, Almendarez-Torres, and Harris, the
Blakely rule incorporates a dizzying array of uncertain and per-

Blakely is in my view so important because by changing the procedures required at
sentencing, it necessarily impacted every case in the criminal justice system. A handful of
other modern-era Supreme Court cases-most obviously Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US
335 (1963) (concerning the right to counsel in felony prosecutions), Terry v Oio, 392 US
1 (1968) (concerning brief police-citizen encounters), and Miranda vArizona, 384 US 436
(1966) (concerning police interrogations)-have shaped or reshaped the criminal justice
system by redefining how police conduct investigations and courts conduct trials. But,
doctrinally and practically, these rulings have their limits-not every criminal case is
affected by Gideon, Terry, and Miranda.Blakely, on the other hand, has the potential to
impact every case in which a defendant is convicted of a crime and subject to punishment.
See Berman, Supreme Court Cleanup in Aisle 4 (discussing limits on the reach and impact of Gideon, Terry, and Miranda). In fact, every case in which a defendant may be
chargedwith a crime could be influenced by Blakely because prosecutors always have an
eye on sentencing when they decide which crimes to charge and how to conduct plea negotiations.
199 As but one marker of the Blakely decision's enormous impact, consider that there
were nearly 1500 online decisions discussing or mentioning the ruling only six month
after it was handed down. See Douglas A. Berman, HappyBlakely Half-Birthday, Sentencing Law and Policy Blog (Dec 24, 2004), available at <http'J/sentencing
.typepad.com/sentencing-law and policy/2004/12/happy-emblakely.html> (last visited
Feb 2, 2005). These numbers do not reflect the tens of thousands of indictments, plea
negotiations, and sentencings Blakely may have altered that do not appear in an onbline
opinion.
200 See Part III.
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haps illogical exceptions.2 °1 By creating an advisory federal sentencing guidelines system, Booker undermines in practice the
entire spirit and chief goals of the modern Apprendi line of jurisprudence.2 "2 Moreover, though Blakely and Booker purport to
focus on the reach and meaning of the Sixth Amendment's right
to a jury trial, the rulings encompass-though without any express analysis whatsoever-critical due process concepts relating
to notice and burdens of proof.20 3 Put simply, the state of sentencing law after Blakely and Booker is, both conceptually and doctrinally, an utter mess.20 4
In my view, however, criticisms of Blakely and Booker are a
form of shooting the messenger: the decisions are ultimately just
the most obvious symptom of a broader disease, one aspect of the
failure to reconceptualize modern sentencing after the demise of
the rehabilitative ideal. As detailed in Part IIof this Article, the
sentencing revolution, which brought law to sentencing, has been
both theoretically and procedurally underdeveloped. Though
commentators have questioned whether we can "reconceive a
good guideline system in light of Blakely,"211 that very framing of
the issue fails to confront the fact that most jurisdictions had not
initially conceived a good guideline system before Blakely.
201

See Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional

Law at Cross-Purposes,105 Colum L Rev 1082, 1086-1101 (2005) (discussing "the convolutions and perversities of the case law" in this arena). Through its recent decision in
Shepard v United States, 161 L Ed 2d 205 (2005), the Supreme Court sowed further confusion and uncertainty regarding the Almendarez-Torres "prior conviction" exception to
the Apprendi rule. In a concurrence in Shepard,Justice Thomas, who in 1998 provided
the key fifth vote for allowing judicial factfinding of prior convictions in AimendarezTorres, contended that the Almendarez-Torres "prior conviction" exception "has been
eroded by this Court's subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the
Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided." Id at 219 (Thomas
concurring). But the four other Justices in the Shepardmajority-the Almendarez-Torres
dissenters, no less-refused to overrule Almendarez-Torres, although they did hint that
they might do so in a future case. Id at 217 n 5.
202 See Morris B. Hoffinan, Booker, Pragmatism and the Moral Jury (forthcoming
2005); Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Sentencing Facts after Booker:
What the Seventh Amendment can Teach the Sixth, 39 Georgia L Rev 895 (2005).
203 See Douglas A. Berman, Beyond Blakely and Booker: PonderingModern Sentencing Process,95 J Crim L & Criminol 653 (2005).
204 Consider Frank 0. Bowman, III, Function Over Formalism: A ProvisionalTheory
of the ConstitutionalLaw of Crime and Punishment, 17 Fed Sent Rptr 1 (2004) (noting
the "oddly configured post-Blakely universe" and lamenting that that Blakely has "created a godawful and unprecedented mess"); Jon Wool, AggravatedSentencing-Blakely v.
Washington: Legal Considerationsfor State Sentencing Systems, Pol and Practice R
(2004) (spotlighting a broad array of legal issues and questions that Blakely raised but
did not resolve).
205 See Panel 2 of Stanford Law School Conference, The FutureofAmerican Sentencing A NationalRoundtable on Blakely, reprinted in 17 Fed Sent Rptr 115 (2004).
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In its Standardsfor CriminalJustice, the American Bar Association insightfully asserts that "without reasonably clear
identification of goals and purposes, the administration of crimi20 6
nal justice will be inconsistent, incoherent, and ineffectual."
But after the sentencing revolution repudiated rehabilitation as
the dominant goal of sentencing, most criminal justice systems
now operate without a reasonably clear identification of sentencing goals and purposes.20 7 And not only have jurisdictions created
sentencing laws without effectively defining or articulating a
clear underlying theory, they also have instituted these laws
without reconsidering or updating sentencing procedures. We are
long overdue to reconceptualize the entire project of modern sentencing reform because the sentencing revolution rejected the old
(offender-oriented) rehabilitative theory, retained its lax administrative procedures for the application of a new (offenseoriented) sentencing structure, and, along the way, policymakers,
courts, and academics collectively have failed to address conceptually the (often troubling) sentencing policy and practice realities that have emerged.
Whatever else one thinks about the outcome of Blakely and
Booker, the decisions merit praise for engendering a robust national dialogue on sentencing law, policy, procedures, and practices. From a practical perspective, such a dialogue is long overdue because federal and state prison populations have swelled
over the last two decades, reaching record-highs nearly every
year.20 8 Moreover, as highlighted throughout this Article, from a
conceptual perspective, such a dialogue is long overdue because
the theories, structure, and procedures for modern sentence decisionmaking have not been seriously rethought following the rejection of a now seemingly antiquated rehabilitative sentencing
philosophy.
206 American Bar Association, Standardsfor CriminalJustice 18-2.1 (3d ed 1994).
207 See Part II.
208 See US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Pison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2004 (Apr 2005); The Sentencing Project, New IncarcerationFgures:
Rising Population Despite Falling Crime Rates (Dec 2004), available at
<http'//www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf> (last visited Feb 6, 2005). Interestingly,
in a powerful speech to the American Bar Association in August 2003, Justice Anthony
Kennedy (one of the Blakely dissenters) urged lawyers to "help start a new public discussion" about sentencing and corrections because, in his view, "[o]ur resources are misspent,
our punishments too severe, our sentences too long." See Speech at the American Bar
Association Annual Meeting by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy (Aug 9, 2003), available at
<httpJ/www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html> (last visited Mar
21, 2005). Though this speech encouraged the ABA to start examining modern sentencing
systems, only the Blakely decision forced these issues into the national conversation.
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Though this tale may seem dark and dire, there is a silver
lining: seeking to understand and define the core conceptual values of Blakely provides not only a needed impetus, but also a
helpful framework, for broadly reconceptualizing modern sentencing reforms. Not surprisingly, the Blakely decision has generated impassioned judicial and academic criticisms because it
seems to announce a destructive rule in search of a sound principle.2" 9 The caustic reaction to Blakely reflects the fact that the
decision has sowed confusion about constitutionally-permissible
sentencing procedures-and risks impeding the continued development of sentencing reforms-without stating a clear principle
to justify the disruption it has caused. And the schizophrenic
Booker decision, by simultaneously extending and undermining
jury-trial rights in the federal sentencing system, necessarily
impedes an effort to mine Blakely and the Court's recent jurisprudence for conceptually-comprehensible principles to guide
modern sentencing reforms.
Nevertheless, I believe there are important conceptual principles at work in Blakely (and Booker), even though the Supreme
Court has been woefully ineffective in articulating and defending
these principles (and their proper limits). Moreover, as part of an
effort to reconceptualize modern sentencing, I believe policymakers, courts, and academics can and should draw from the many
"on-the-ground" developments that the sentencing revolution has
brought in legislatures, sentencing commissions, and courtrooms
for three decades. There is a stunning and rich array of fledgling
and partially-developed concepts in state and federal sentencing
laws and guidelines just waiting to be appreciated and analyzed.
Though existing in varied forms with varied attributes, the raw
material for effectively reconceptualizing sentencing for modern
times already is burgeoning in the diverse and dynamic sentencing reform developments of the sentencing revolution. To date,
however, policymakers, courts, and academics largely have failed
to fully appreciate and effectively analyze the revolutionary developments in the field of sentencing over the last thirty years.
In the concluding subsections below, I seek to identify some
conceptual principles that might be mined from Blakely and
Booker and from recent federal and state sentencing reforms.
Through this very brief effort to draw conceptual principles from
modern sentencing developments, I do not mean to suggest I
209

See Blakely, 124 S Ct at 2544-50 (O'Connor dissenting); id at 2551-62 (Breyer

dissenting); Bowman, 17 Fed Sent Rptr 1 (cited in note 204).
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have found the only or the key foundational concepts for modern
sentencing reforms; rather my modest goal here is to highlight
that thoughtful examination of Blakely and Booker and thirty
years of "on-the-ground" reforms may help chart a path for the
sound reconceptualizing of modern sentencing.
Reconceptualizing Sentencing Theory

A.

Though the Apprendi-Blakely line of cases is formally about
sentencing procedures, the concepts and consequences of these
cases reflect, at least indirectly, a revised understanding of sentencing theory after the demise of the rehabilitative ideal.
Though the Apprendi-Blakely line never explores or even examines the express or implicit theories driving modern sentencing
reform, these cases clearly are the product of efforts by legislators and sentencing commissions to pursue greater uniformity at
sentencing through statutory and guidelines reforms.2 1 ° Indeed,
one might (over) simplify the dynamic and intricate story of
modern sentencing reform as reflecting a shift from (excessive)
devotion to the "rehabilitative ideal" to (excessive) devotion to a
"uniformity ideal."
But just as the old sentencing world's commitment to the rehabilitative ideal proved both unrealistic and ineffective, so too
have we learned that the new sentencing world's commitment to
a "uniformity ideal" has proven unrealistic and ineffective. First,
as Professor Kevin Cole and others have noted, any discussion of
disparity and uniformity is fundamentally vacuous when not
grounded in a particular substantive theory of punishment."
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, even if we are able to
develop a deep substantive conception of sentencing uniformity,
210

Justice Breyer's opinion for the remedial-majority in Booker perhaps most clearly

reflects the impact of the modern pursuit of sentencing uniformity: to address Blakely
problems in the federal sentencing system, Justice Breyer crafts a remarkable remedy for
the Court that makes the federal guidelines advisory, purportedly in service to Congress's
goals of achieving greater sentencing uniformity through its enactment of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984. See Booker, 125 S Ct at 759. Consider Michael M. O'Hear, The Myth
of Uniformity, 17 Fed Sent Rptr 249 (2005) (criticizing statements by Justice Breyer in
Booker concerning the pursuit of sentencing uniformity); Hoffman, Booker, Pragmatism
and the Moral Jury(cited in note 202) (criticizing the Booker remedy).
211 Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea ofSentencing Disparity,91 Nw U L Rev 1336, 133641 (1997). See also Rappaport, 6 Buff Crim L Rev at 1069-70 (cited in note 60) (explaining that "judgments about unwarranted disparity rest on a judgment about which offenders are similarly situated, which in turn requires some assumption about the moral purpose of punishment"); Miller, 54 Emory L J at 275 (cited in note 61) (highlighting that "for
a system to reduce unwarranted disparity there must be some theory of what types of
variation are warranted").
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experience has proved that uniformity is likely always to be an
elusive goal because of the overlapping discretion of the many
actors who can impact sentencing outcomes.2 12
Many critics of modern sentencing reforms astutely have
highlighted the various harms of a blind pursuit of sentencing
uniformity.2 13 In the words of one set of leading critics of the federal sentencing system, "[u]niform treatment ought to be one
objective of sentencing, to be sure, but not the sole or overriding
objective."21 4 Against this backdrop, we might see Blakely as
shedding new light on long-running debates about efforts to
achieve greater uniformity through modern sentencing reforms.
The Blakely decision might be viewed in part as a statement by
the United States Supreme Court that some other values-in
this case procedural values such as the jury-trial right and a
broad commitment to adversarial justice-need to be balanced
with, or perhaps integrated into, our modern quest to achieve
sentencing uniformity. Indeed, Justice Scalia's opinion for the
Court in Blakely speaks of the "salutary objectives" that
"prompted Washington's adoption of determinate sentencing,
including proportionality to the gravity of the offense and parity
among defendants," but explains that the Blakely decision is

212

See, for example, US Sentencing Commission, Fifteen Years of GuidelinesSentenc-

ing: An Assessment of How Well the FederalCrminal Justice System Is Achieving the
Goals of Sentencing Reform xii, 81-92 (Nov 2004) (discussing disparities introduced at
pre-sentencing stages and explaining that "a variety of evidence developed throughout
the guidelines era suggest that the mechanisms and procedures designed to control disparity arising at pre-sentencing stages are not all working as intended and have not been
adequate to fully achieve uniformity of sentencing"); Stephen J. Schulhofer and Ilene H.
Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the FederalGuidelines:Guideline Circumvention and Its
Dynamics in the Post-MistrettaPeriod,91 Nw U L Rev 1284 (1997) (documenting that
guidelines are circumvented in a significant percentage of cases); US Sentencing Commission, MandatoryMinimum Sentencing in the Federal CriminalJustice System ii-iii,
61-85 (Aug 1991) (detailing that "lack of uniform application [of mandatory sentencing
provisions] creates unwarranted disparity in sentencing, and compromises the potential
for the guidelines sentencing system to reduce disparity").
213 See, for example, O'Hear, 17 Fed Sent Rptr at 249 (cited in note 210) (discussing
the harms of "exalt[ing] uniformity to the detriment of other important objectives" in a
sentencing system); Miller, 54 Emory L J (2005) (cited in note 61); Stith and Cabranes,
FearofJudging(citedin note 12).
214 Kate Stith and Josi A. Cabranes, To FearJudgingNo More: Recommendations for
the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 11 Fed Sent Rptr 187, 187 (1999). See also Daniel J.
Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:UnacceptableLimits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 Yale L J 1681, 1703-05 (1992); Michael Tonry, Salvaging the
Sentencing Guidelinesin Seven Easy Steps, 4 Fed Sent Rptr 355, 355 (1992); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Failureof Sentencing Guidelines:A Plea for Less Aggregation,4 Fed Sent
Rptr 161, 161-62 (1991).
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about ensuring that those objectives are "implemented in a way
that respects the Sixth Amendment."2 15
Saying that uniformity must be balanced with other sentencing goals of course does not go very far in creating a new set of
conceptual principles for modern sentencing reforms. Fortunately, as academics come to recognize the impact of the conceptual vacuum resulting from the demise of the rehabilitative
ideal, significant work is underway seeking to forge a new set of
punishment theories for modern sentencing reforms.
Specifically, the American Law Institute, through its revision of the sentencing part of the Model Penal Code, 216 as well as
several other scholars and authors,21 are starting to embrace
and actively promote for modern sentencing systems the hybrid
theory of "limiting retributivism." The theory of limiting retributivism, which provides that retributivist notions of desert provide
outer limits on permissible punishments and that utilitarian
goals can operate within those limits, was first championed by
Professor Norval Morris."' A number of insightful observers
have suggested that many modern sentencing reforms already
reflect, indirectly if not by design, limiting retributivism principles.21 9 It might even be said that the Apprendi-Blakely rule, by
requiring jury determinations and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt when the law defines an upper limit on available punishments and allowing judicial punishment determinations within
those limits, reflects a particular procedural commitment to
principles embodied by limiting retributivism.
In addition, and also drawing from the path-breaking work
of Norval Morris, the sentencing value of parsimony might come
to play a much larger role in the modern development and evolu215 Blakely, 124 S Ct at 2540.
216 See Reitz, Model Penal Code at 4 (cited in note 71) (reporting that the Model Penal
Code's revision of its sentencing articles will borrow from Morris's theory of limiting retributivism).
217 See, for example, Richard Frase, LimitingRetributivism, in Tonry, ed, The Future
of Imprisonment 83, 112 (cited in note 2) (concluding that Morris's theory of limiting
retributivism provides the best starting point for researchers, reformers, and sentencing
policymakers to develop a consensus model of punishment); Hofer and Allenbach, 40 Am
Crim L Rev at 73-75 (cited in note 61) (arguing that by identifying the philosophy underlying the Guidelines to be a modified version of "just deserts," judges will be able to interpret ambiguous provisions and apply the Guidelines properly).
218 Morris, The Future oflmpnisonment at 60 (cited in note 42) ("No sanction should
be imposed greater than that which is 'deserved' for the last crime, or series of crimes for
which the offender is being sentenced.").
219 See, for example, Reitz, Model Penal Code at 4 (cited in note 71); Frase, Limiting
Retributivism (cited in note 217); Hofer and Allenbach, 40 Am Crim L Rev (cited in note
61).
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tion of sentencing policy and practice. The parsimony principle,
the roots of which may trace back to the work of Jeremy Bentham,2 2 ° calls for the imposition of the least punitive or burdensome punishment that will achieve valid social purposes.2 2 ' The
federal Sentencing Reform Act includes a parsimony provision
through its instruction to judges in 18 USC § 3553(a) that "the
court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes [of punishment] set forth
in [the Sentencing Reform Act],"2 22 and provisions some other
modern state sentencing systems might also be said to reflect
parsimony principles.2 23 Though the federal parsimony provision
received little attention during the first fifteen years of federal
guidelines sentencing,2 2 4 the Booker remedy now makes the federal parsimony provision a more central part of the federal sentencing enterprise, and lower courts already are grappling
thoughtfully with this important concept in federal sentencing.2 2 5
It might be said also that the Apprendi-Blakely rule, by allowing
an increase to available punishments only based on jury determinations and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, also reflects a
particular procedural commitment to parsimony principles.
Though a full account of the substantive theories of limiting
retributivism and parsimony (and their possible flaws) are beyond the scope of this Article, my goal is simply to spotlight some
of the substantive sentencing theories that might be drawn from
Blakely and Booker and thirty years of "on the ground" reforms
to inform the project of reconceptualizing modern sentencing.
Though limiting retributivism and parsimony may not necessar220 See Jeremy Bentham, Of the Influence of Time andPlace in Matters ofLegislation

(1843). See also Michael Tonry, Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Guidelines, 23
Crime & Just 199, 206-07 (1998).
221 See Morris, The Future of Imprisonment at 60-62 (cited in note 42) ("The least
restrictive-least punitive-sanction necessary to achieve defined social purposes should
be chosen."). See also Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishmentin Liberal Democracy, 7
Buff Crim L Rev 307 (2004) (discussing the parsimony principle in similar, through
slightly different, terms).
222 18 USC § 3553(a). See also United States v Wilson, 350 F Supp 2d 910, 922-24 (D
Utah 2005) (discussing the Sentencing Reform Act's parsimony provision).
223 See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003 at 133
(cited in note 69) (explaining the adoption of a parsimony provision in the Minnesota
sentencing guidelines by the Minnesota Sentencing Commission).
224 See Marc L. Miller, Domination andDissatisfaction:Prosecutorsas Sentencers, 56
Stan L Rev 1211, 1216 n 9 (2004); Marc L. Miller and Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin'
Heart(land): The Long Search for Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 Buff Crim L Rev
723, 810 n 57 (1999).
225 See Wilson, 350 F Supp 2d at 922-24 (D Utah 2005) (exploring the meaning and
impact of the federal parsimony provision); United States v Brown, 356 F Supp 2d 470,
479 (M D Pa 2005) (same).
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ily be the only or the most appropriate theories to help fill the
conceptual vacuum left by the demise of the rehabilitative
ideal,22 6 all of these modern developments bode well for developing a more solid conceptual foundation for future sentencing reforms.
B.

Reconceptualizing Sentencing Procedures

Turning from matters of sentencing theory to matters of sentencing process, we can and should identify fundamental procedural principles at work in the Apprendi-Blakely line of cases. As
I have developed more fully in another recent article,2 27 the
Blakely principle, and its proper limit, could be better understood and appreciated if the Supreme Court linked its rulings to
the constitutional text that it purports to be applying. The jurytrial right at issue in the Blakely line of cases actually appears
twice in the United States Constitution. Section 2 of Article III
provides, "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment,
shall be by jury. "228 The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."229 The Constitution, by framing the jury-trial right in terms of "crimes," which
are the basis for a "prosecution" of "the accused," connotes that
this right attaches to all offense conduct for which the state
seeks to impose criminal punishment, but the language also connotes that the jury-trial right does not attach to any offender
characteristicsthat the state may deem relevant to criminal punishment.
In short, an essential offense/offender distinction should inform the jury-trial right.22 ' This offense/offender distinction, in
226 An interesting competing conceptual vision for sentencing, which has been championed most forcefully by Oregon Judge Michael Marcus and which also seems to be gaining adherents in England, calls for redesigning the criminal justice system and sentencing decisionmaking around the goal of "rational crime reduction" or "reducing reoffending." See Michael H. Marcus, Sentencingin the Temple of Denunciation: Crfiminal Justice's Weakest Link, 1 Ohio St J Crim L 671, 677-81 (2004), John Halliday, Marking
Pumishments Work: Report of a Review of the Sentencing Framework for England and
Whales (Home Office, July 2001), available at <httpJ/www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs/
halliday.html> (last visited May 20, 2005). I am grateful to Jonathan Wroblewski for the
wise suggestion that this philosophy not be overlooked as I advocate efforts to develop a
new and sound conceptual foundation for modern sentencing reforms.
227 Douglas A. Berman, ConceptualizingBlakely, 17 Fed Sent Rptr 89 (2004).
228 US Const Art III, § 2.
229 US Const Amend VI.
230Perhaps to be more faithful to the constitutional text, I should describe this key
point in terms of a crimes/criminals distinction. But the offense/offender language seems
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addition to being suggested by the text of the Constitution, resonates with and is buttressed by the distinctive institutional competencies of juries and judges, and the distinctive judicial ambit
of trials and sentencings. Trials are about establishing the specific offense conduct that the state believes merits criminal punishment; sentencing is about assessing both the offense and the
offender to impose a just and effective punishment. Juries can
reasonably be expected to determine all offense conduct at a presentencing trial, and the state can reasonably be required to
prove to a jury at trial all the specific offense conduct for which
the state seeks to impose punishment. But judges are better positioned to consider potentially-prejudicial offender characteristics at a post-trial sentencing, and the state should be permitted
to proffer information concerning an offender's life and circumstances directly to a judge in order to assist punishment determinations. To parrot the language of Justice Scalia's opinion for
the Blakely Court, we "give intelligible content to the right of
jury trial" by concluding that juries must find all the "facts of the
crime the State actually seeks to punish."2 3 ' Or to seize the language of Justice Stevens in the merits opinion of Booker, in light
of the "new trend in the legislative regulation of sentencing," we
can "preserve Sixth Amendment substance" by demanding that
the state prove to a jury at trial all the specific offense conduct
for which the state seeks to impose punishment.2 32
Understanding Blakely and the jury-trial right through the
offense/offender distinction suggests that the Supreme Court's
decision in Almendarez-Torres and the "prior conviction" exception to the Apprendi-Blakely rule is constitutionally sound. Prior
to be a linguistically-better way to capture the same substantive point.
231 124 S Ct at 2538-39 (emphasis in original).
232 Moreover, given the Blakely ruling's emphasis on "factfinding"-and also given
that questions of fact are traditionally considered the province of a jury, while questions
of law are traditionally for judicial determination-we might also identify and draw insight from a fact/law distinction operating at heart of the Blakely principle. But just as
offense/offender distinctions historically have been swept under the broad rug of judicial
discretion, likewise historically there has been precious little development or even consideration of the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law at sentencing.
A fact/law distinction is becoming of great importance at sentencing in the wake of
Blakely, some lower courts have already held that, though Blakely requires juries to
make punishment-enhancing findings of facts, judges can still make punishmentenhancing judgments of law. See, for example, United States v Trala, 386 F3d 536, 547 n
15 (3d Cir 2004) (explaining that "whether an offense is a 'crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense' is a legal determination, which does not raise an issue of fact under
Blakely); United States v Swan, 327 F Supp 2d 1068, 1073 (D Neb 2004) (concluding that
a "determination of whether attempted robbery amounts to a crime of violence is a question of law" that does not implicate Blakely).
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convictions clearly are the consummate offender characteristic.
to have a prior conviction is not in and of itself a "crime" and the
state cannot bring an "accusation" and pursue a "criminal prosecution" based only on the fact that an offender has a criminal
past. Because the fact of a prior conviction is an offender characteristic that is not generally an essential part of the "crimes" that
the state seeks to punish, the jury-trial right should not be constitutionally implicated even when prior conviction facts are the
basis for specific punishment consequences at sentencing. A focus on the distinctive institutional competencies of juries and
judges reinforces this conclusion: requiring jury consideration of
evidence of prior convictions at trial risks prejudicing a jury's
consideration of a defendant's alleged current criminal conduct; a
judge considering a wide array of facts and issues at sentencing
is less likely to be inappropriately biased by evidence of prior
convictions.
Beyond its ability to conceptually ground the Supreme
Court's recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the offense/offender distinction provides useful guideposts for considering a range of other issues of sentencing policy and practice and
can help policymakers and courts develop a more refined approach to substantive and procedural sentencing issues. A reexamination of a range of sentencing issues may be usefully informed by the offense/offender distinction, and the work of legislatures, sentencing commissions, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
probation officers, and parole boards all may be furthered by an
attentiveness to the offense/offender distinction.
CONCLUSION

The modern revolution of sentencing laws and practices
marks one of the most dynamic and important law reform stories
in recent American legal history. But, as detailed in this Article,
one hallmark of this revolution has been a conceptual shallowness that has negatively impacted the work of all the institutions
that have had a hand in the revolution. Placed in proper historical and conceptual context, we can better see that the United
States Supreme Court's recent work in Blakely and Booker is
just the latest dramatic chapter in a lengthy, dynamic, and conceptually confused story about the modern evolution of sentencing rules and practices.
A chief lesson to be drawn from Blakely and Booker and the
dramas that have surrounded these decisions is that policymakers, courts, and academics are long overdue to take up the task of
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reconceptualizing modern sentencing. Attentiveness to sentencing concepts such as limiting retributivism, parsimony and the
offense/offender distinction perhaps could help begin the overall-and overdue-project of broadly reconceptualizing modern
sentencing reforms. But, in the wake of the turmoil and uncertainty produced by Blakely and Booker, the specifics of the project of reconceptualizing modern sentencing are less important
than just an appreciation that the project must begin.
Thus, to conclude, I exhort policymakers, courts, and particularly scholars to start serious work on the task of reconceptualizing sentencing for modern times. In so doing, I suggest that
this task can and immediately should advance by mining important but underdeveloped principles from Blakely and Booker, as
well as all the raw conceptual materials to be found in the diverse and dynamic sentencing laws and practices that have
emerged in jurisdictions nationwide. The task of reconceptualizing modern sentencing is a massive undertaking, but Blakely
and Booker can be not only critical catalysts, but also great assets, in this project. Efforts to flesh out these decisions' core principles, as well as to find appropriate limits to those principles,
should provide an effective running start on reconceptualizing
the project and goals of modern sentencing reforms.

